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本文分别在地方政府是中央政府代理人、理性经济人和寻租型经营者三种角色下,通过构建“中央政府—地方政府—企业—消费者”的理论分析框架,剖析地方政府和企业的行为逻辑影响最低质量标准规制政策实施效果的机理。研究结果发现:相比于地方政府是中央政府代理人的情形,当地方政府是理性经济人时,企业效用水平和地方政府效用水平将会增加,而企业遵从程度、消费者效用水平和社会福利水平将会降低;而当地方政府是寻租型经营者时,企业效用水平和地方政府效用水平达到最高,企业遵从程度、消费者效用水平和社会福利水平却变为最低。因此,只有深入理解地方政府和企业的行为逻辑,才能更好地预测和评价最低质量标准规制的现实遵从程度和社会福利效应。
In this paper, under the three roles of local government, central government agent, rational economic man and rent-seeking manager respectively, this paper analyzes the relationship between local government and the government through the theoretical framework of “central government-local government-enterprise-consumer” The mechanism of enterprise behavior logic influencing the implementation effect of the lowest quality standard regulation policy. The result shows that when local governments are rational economic agents, the utility level of enterprises and the utility of local governments will increase compared with that of local governments when they are agents of the central government. However, the compliance of enterprises, the utility level of consumers and social welfare When the local governments are rent-seeking managers, the enterprise utility level and the local government utility level reach the highest level, while the compliance level of the enterprises, the consumer utility level and the social welfare level become the lowest. Therefore, only by understanding the behavioral logic of local governments and enterprises can we better predict and evaluate the actual compliance with the minimum quality standards and the social welfare effects.