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本文基于现金持有市场价值模型,检验了中国上市公司高管变更的治理效应。结果表明,就整体而言,高管变更能够显著提高现金持有的市场价值,意味着高管变更具有治理效应,但这种价值提升效应依赖于公司的治理机制、所有权性质以及高管变更类型。具体表现为: (1)对于治理较差的公司,高管变更能够显著提高现金的市场价值,但在治理较好的公司中并不存在这种价值提升效应; (2)相对而言,国有上市公司中的高管变更能够在更大程度上提高现金的市场价值; (3)改良性变更对公司价值的提升作用大于摩擦性变更,而自然性变更则会降低公司价值。
Based on the model of cash holding market value, this paper examines the governance effects of changes in the senior management of listed companies in China. The results show that, as a whole, executive changes can significantly increase the market value of cash holdings, which means that executive changes have a governance effect, but this value enhancement effect depends on the company’s governance mechanism, the nature of ownership, and the type of senior management changes. . Specifically: (1) For companies with poor governance, executive changes can significantly increase the market value of cash, but there is no such value-boosting effect in companies with better governance; (2) Relatively speaking, Changes in the senior management of listed companies can increase the market value of cash to a greater extent; (3) The improvement effect of improvement on the value of the company is greater than the change in friction, while the change in nature will reduce the value of the company.