激励机制问题是委托 -代理关系中的核心问题 ,文中利用委托 -代理理论对激励机制问题进行了探讨 ,分别给出了对称信息、非对称信息条件下激励机制的有关特征和相关解释。在对称信息条件下 ,激励机制的设计必须满足 :代理人努力的边际收益等于其边际成本。在非对称信息条件下 ,如代理人是风险中性的 ,则可以实现帕累托最优 ;如代理人是风险规避的 ,则帕累托最优不能实现 Incentive mechanism is the core issue of the principal-agent relationship. In this paper, the issue of incentive mechanism is discussed by using the principal-agent theory. Relevant features and related explanations of the incentive mechanism under symmetric and asymmetric information are given respectively. Under the condition of symmetric information, the incentive mechanism must be designed to meet the following conditions: The marginal revenue of the agent’s efforts is equal to its marginal cost. Pareto optimality can be achieved if the agent is risk-neutral under asymmetric information conditions; Pareto optimality can not be achieved if the agent is risk-averse