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本文探讨了决定着企业决策权利的正式权威的分配问题。本文试图在具有不确定性的团队生产的背景下,在有限(个人)理性的公理性假设基础上,提出一种解释性假说,以便解答“企业的权威关系是如何形成的”问题,并从中导出资本所有者拥有权威的结论。本文认为,由于实物资本沉淀成本的存在,在有限的时间范围内,当经营可能失败的具体时间无法预知时,事先针对该时间区间内资本(所有者)损失精确的分期补偿是不可能的,即实物资本提供者的权威因子的事前定价是不可行的。因此,雇佣资本的合约不存在事前的可描述性,除非实物资本的沉淀成本可以忽略不计。这就是资本所有者之所以能够成为权威拥有者以及实物资本极少被雇佣的根本原因。
This article explores the distribution of formal authority that determines the decision-making power of business. This paper attempts to propose an explanatory hypothesis on the basis of limited (personal) rational axioms in the context of team production with uncertainties in order to answer the question "How does the authoritative relationship of enterprises form? And derive the conclusion that the capital owner owns the authority. This paper argues that due to the existence of the physical capital deposition cost, it is impossible to accurately compensate for the loss of capital (owner) within the time frame in a limited time frame when the specific time when the operation may fail can not be predicted. That is to say, the advance pricing of the authoritative factor of physical capital providers is not feasible. Therefore, there is no antecedent descriptiveness for the contract of employment of capital unless the cost of settling the physical capital is negligible. This is the root cause of the capitalist's ability to become the authoritative owner and the very low employment of physical capital.