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我国的农业保险正处于摸索和发展阶段,国家采取了诸如政策支持、财政补贴等方式积极促进农业保险的发展。然而,政策性农业保险中的自愿参与原则,容易引发逆向选择问题,不利于农业保险政策及其经营主体的发展。通过构建博弈模型分析,结合现实的国情国力,发现自愿参与原则与完全强制原则都不适合政策性农业保险。而适度强制的原则,兼顾了制度的强制性和灵活性,有利于当前政策性农业保险的进一步发展。
China’s agricultural insurance is in a groping and development stage, and the state has taken such measures as policy support and financial subsidies to actively promote the development of agricultural insurance. However, the principle of voluntary participation in policy-oriented agricultural insurance can easily lead to the problem of adverse selection and is not conducive to the development of agricultural insurance policies and its management entities. Through building a game model and combining with the reality of the national strength, we find that the principle of voluntary participation and the principle of total compulsion are not suitable for policy-oriented agricultural insurance. The principle of moderate compulsion takes into account the compulsion and flexibility of the system and is conducive to the further development of the current policy-oriented agricultural insurance.