C.万斯认为,本质主义者对于事件的任何同一性界定,都可以借助“回收问题”加以诘难。这种诘难可以视作更普遍意义上的“复制论证”的一个子类。但我们至少有两种方式维系事件模态刚性的直觉:其一,我们可以在模态语境下将事件解释为构成事件的对象的图式,从而将事件的模态同一性问题转换为对象(事物)的模态同一性问题;其二,我们可以接受回收论证的结论,认为事件的同一性能够在可能世界间出现分岔,从而容许谈论事件在可能世界间的同一性。 C Vance argues that any essentialist definition of the event can be harmed by “recycling problems.” This difficulty can be seen as a subclass of “replication argument” in the more general sense. But we have at least two ways to maintain the intuition of the rigidities of event modalities: first, we can interpret events as patterns of objects that make up an event in a modal context, translating the modality identity of an event into an object (Things); and second, we can accept the conclusion of the recovery argument that the identities of the events can bifurcate between possible worlds, allowing us to talk about the identities of possible events in the world.