论文部分内容阅读
本文通过建立商业银行风险偏好模型和模仿者动态模型,将银行业视为有限理性的金融生态系统,开展进化博弈分析和实证检验。结果表明,当高风险资产的预期收益率高于低风险资产时,资本监管将降低商业银行风险偏好,考虑到大银行和中小银行风险期望和风险管控能力的差距以及中小企业融资满足率现状,最终可能形成大银行专注大企业贷款、中小银行专注中小企业贷款的市场结构。为了缓解中小企业融资难,要降低银行业门槛,合理引导私人资本进入银行体系,通过银行业的竞争提高中小企业融资满足率。
This article through the establishment of commercial banks risk preference model and imitator dynamic model, the banking industry as a bounded rationality of the financial ecosystem, to carry out evolutionary game analysis and empirical test. The results show that when the expected return of high-risk assets is higher than that of low-risk assets, capital supervision will reduce the risk appetite of commercial banks. Considering the gap between risk appetite and risk control ability of large banks and small and medium-sized banks and the current situation of SME financing satisfaction rate, In the end, it may be possible for large banks to focus on large enterprise loans and small and medium banks to focus on the market structure for SME loans. In order to alleviate the financing difficulty of SMEs, it is necessary to lower the threshold of the banking sector, to properly guide private capital into the banking system and to increase the financing satisfaction rate of SMEs through banking competition.