本文是来自于中国近年来实行民营化改制实践的一个理论结晶。该研究在中国特定的渐进改革基础上 ,讨论了民营化发生的原因和阻力 ,以及国有企业的利益相关者在改制过程中的利益权衡行为 ,并根据它们的相互关系和目标行为建立了民营化的均衡模型。模型的核心是企业家的最优目标函数 ,这是关系到企业能否实现成功改制的关键。模型的约束条件反映了利益相关者的基本利益保障 ,不会由于改制而受到损害。因此 ,均衡条件的满足表明了最优化改制的实现。通过对模型的分析发现 ,能够满足民营化最优均衡的退出条件 ,就是国有企业退出的最佳时机选择。企业净资本价值、企业家对股权的收购值与职工补偿值之间的合理比例的区间 ,是形成民营化均衡模型的最优解的取值范围。模型的政策含义在于纠偏作用 ,尤其是政府实际的退出时机与改制均衡的最佳退出时机的不一致 ,对于职工利益的损害或缺乏企业家最优目标行为的改制 ,都是脱离了最优轨道的结果 ,需要进行纠正 This article is a theoretical crystallization from the practice of reforming privatization in China in recent years. Based on China’s specific gradual reforms, the study discussed the causes and resistances of privatization, and the interest-sharing behavior of stakeholders in the process of restructuring the state-owned enterprises, and established privatization based on their mutual relations and target behaviors. The equilibrium model. The core of the model is the entrepreneur’s optimal objective function, which is the key to the success of the enterprise. The constraints of the model reflect the protection of the basic interests of stakeholders and will not be compromised due to restructuring. Therefore, the satisfaction of the equilibrium conditions indicates the realization of optimization and restructuring. Through the analysis of the model, it can be found that the optimal and balanced exit conditions for privatization are the best timing for state-owned enterprises to exit. The range of the reasonable ratio between the value of the company’s net capital, the value of the entrepreneur’s acquisition of the equity, and the employee’s compensation value is the range of values ​​for the optimal solution to the privatization equilibrium model. The policy implications of the model lie in the corrective action, especially the inconsistency between the actual withdrawal timing of the government and the optimal timing of exit from restructuring, and the loss of employee interests or the lack of entrepreneurial optimal target behavior are all out of the optimal orbit. As a result, need to be corrected