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通过能源贸易博弈主体行为分析,提出监管机构、贸易双方的动态博弈及承运人单向混合策略博弈构成的多方复合博弈模型,给出其一般情况、考虑超额排放及排放交易时博弈各方不同策略的收益矩阵,分析结果监管机构采用强制性政策的收益总是多于鼓励性政策,有超额排放及排放交易时买方和监管机构的收益由买方使用的能源种类决定,承运人应按承运某种能源收益较大的概率调整其运力比例。由新旧能源的效益差可得强制性政策的有效临界值,但新旧能源能效比、市场消化条件、效用类型等因素都会影响政策的有效程度。
Through the analysis of the main behavior of the energy trade game, the multi-compound game model consisting of the dynamic game of the regulator and the trade and the one-way mixed strategy game of the carrier is proposed. The general situation is given, and the different tactics of each game in the game of excess emissions and emissions trading The results of the analysis of regulatory agencies using compulsory policies always more than the benefits of incentive policies, there is excess emissions and emissions trading buyers and regulators of the revenue by the buyer to use the type of energy decisions, the carrier should be carried by a The probability of a greater energy yield adjusts its capacity ratio. The effective threshold of compulsory policies can be obtained from the difference between the benefits of new and old energy sources. However, factors such as energy efficiency of old and new energy sources, market digestion conditions and types of utility affect the effectiveness of policies.