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考虑一个客户企业与一个服务商共同努力实现服务外包项目价值的缔约问题,服务参与双方努力程度的无法验证和服务商可能拥有私有成本信息会降低服务绩效,导致服务外包失败。针对双方努力程度无法验证和服务商拥有私有信息这两类风险因素,建立甄别服务商私有信息的委托代理模型,分析非对称信息下的最优契约,刻画了合作生产性质服务外包环境特点对两类风险因素带来的不利效应的影响。研究结果表明,在服务商成本信息对称情形下,激励共享仅受合作双方的相对重要性的影响;而在服务商成本信息不对称情形下,低成本类型服务商的激励共享不变,高成本类型服务商的激励共享还与两种类型服务商的分布和成本差异相关。服务商的重要性越高,服务商私有信息带来的损失越高;服务商与客户企业的重要性相差不大时,努力程度不可验证带来的损失较高。
Considering the contradiction between the value of service outsourcing projects that a client company and a service provider work together to achieve, the unleashed effort of service participants and the possibility of service providers owning proprietary cost information will reduce service performance and result in service outsourcing failure. In view of the two types of risk factors, which can not be verified by both parties’ efforts and private information owned by service providers, a principal-agent model for screening private information of service providers is established, and the optimal contract under asymmetric information is analyzed. The effect of adverse effects caused by risk factors. The results show that incentive sharing is only affected by the relative importance of the two partners when the cost information of service providers is symmetric. In the asymmetric cost information of service providers, incentive sharing of low-cost service providers is the same, and the cost Incentive sharing of type providers is also related to the distribution and cost differences between the two types of service providers. The higher the importance of the service provider, the higher the loss caused by the private information of the service provider; the less the importance of the service provider and the client company is, the higher the loss caused by the non-verifiable effort.