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股份回购具有影响股价波动、利益输送和易操控的特性,其对公开、公平、公正的《证券法》原则的贯彻构成威胁。《证券法》框架下“持续经营能力”标准的模糊性,使上市公司可以较随意地启动和实施回购。而《公司法》框架下的债权人同意程序又使“即期清偿能力”——公司以现金等资产的快速变现偿债或提供担保的能力,形成了对股份回购准入门槛的实质性规制。从长远看,双重准入标准可能导致劣币驱逐良币的效果:一股独大、存在治理缺陷的公司敢于避实就虚、铤而走险,而治理规范、财务健康的公司对回购敬而远之。对此,在《证券法》框架下合理、细致地设定回购的准入标准,是优化回购监管的突破口。
Share repurchase has the characteristics of influencing the stock price volatility, the transfer of benefits and the controllability. It poses a threat to the implementation of the principle of open, fair and equitable securities law. Under the framework of the Securities Law, the ambiguity of the standard of “going concern ability” makes listed companies can start and implement repurchase more freely. The “creditor consent” procedure in the framework of the “Company Law” makes the “immediate solvency” - the ability of the company to repay debt or provide guarantees with quick cash and other assets, forming the substance of the threshold for the right of access to stock repurchases Sexual regulation. In the long run, double entry standards may lead to the effect of bad money driving away bad money: a company with a dominant position and governance deficiencies will dare to avoid it and take the risk while corporate governance practices and financial health are far from repurchase. In this regard, reasonable and detailed set of admission criteria for repurchase under the framework of the Securities Law is a breakthrough to optimize the repo supervision.