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本文以2009-2011年在证券交易所上市的民营上市公司为研究对象,从终极控制人的角度来分析终极控制人对公司资本结构决策的影响作用。本文实证分析了存在终极控制人的上市公司控制权与现金流权相互分离对资本结构的影响,进一步研究较高的现金流权对股东侵占行为的约束作用。研究发现终极控制人控制权与现金流权分离程度越高,其资产负债率就会越高;同时较高的现金流权会有效的制约终极控制人为获取私益不断扩张负债融资的动机。
This article takes the private listed companies listed on the stock exchange from 2009 to 2011 as the research object and analyzes the influence of the ultimate controller on the capital structure decision of the company from the perspective of the ultimate controller. This paper empirically analyzes the impact of the separation of control and cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder on the capital structure, and further studies the restraining effect of higher cash flow rights on the encroachment of shareholders. The research finds that the higher the degree of separation of control power and cash flow right from the ultimate controller, the higher the ratio of assets and liabilities. Meanwhile, the higher cash flow right will effectively restrict the motivation for the ultimate controller to obtain private benefit and expand the liability financing.