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本文从信息经济学的角度探讨信息不对称条件下的信贷风险的形成机理。首先,对信贷活动中信息不对称所产生的逆向选择与道德风险及由此产生的信贷风险进行了一般理论分析;其次,结合我国信贷市场预算约束软化这一基本特征,研究了我国信贷活动中由于信息不对称而产生的信贷风险的特殊性和严重性;最后,文章从提高信息对称度、建立激励约束机制两个方面对加强我国商业银行信贷风险管理提出了建议。
This paper explores the formation mechanism of credit risk under the condition of information asymmetry from the perspective of information economics. First of all, this paper makes a general theoretical analysis on the adverse selection and moral hazard arising from the asymmetric information in credit activities and the credit risk arising therefrom. Secondly, combining the basic features of the restraint and softening of credit market budget in our country, Because of the asymmetric information, the particularity and seriousness of credit risk; Finally, the article puts forward some suggestions to strengthen the credit risk management of commercial banks in our country from the aspects of improving information symmetry and setting up incentive and restraint mechanisms.