与市场经济国家中银行不良贷款产生的技术性原因不同,转轨时期中国国有银行所面临的不良贷款(注:本文均指国有银行的不良贷款)则是因制度性的信用风险而产生。公有产权制度所隐含的政府担保衍生出社会成本—收益和个人成本—收益关系的歧异,国有银行的信用风险和不良贷款也因此而产生。主流中国经济学家将国有银行的不良贷款问题看成是制度转轨的函数,即从制度经济学而不是从一般性市场经济制度下的非对称信息探讨转轨时期的不良贷款问题。基于政府在中国转轨过程中的主导作用,本文从政府补贴转轨成本的菜单 Different from the technical reasons for non-performing loans of banks in market economy countries, the non-performing loans that state-owned Chinese banks face during the transitional period are caused by institutional credit risk. The government guarantee implicit in the public property rights system leads to the social cost - the difference between income and personal cost - income relationship, resulting in the credit risk and non-performing loans of state-owned banks. Mainstream Chinese economists regard the issue of non-performing loans of state-owned banks as a function of institutional transition, that is, from the perspective of institutional economics rather than asymmetric information under the general market economic system to explore the problem of non-performing loans during the transition period. Based on the leading role of the government in the process of transition in China, this article from the menu of government subsidies to transition costs