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政府采购是政府实现行政职能的重要手段,通常采用政府向私人部门以市场化的公开采购流程来实现,这就形成了纳税人—政府—采购机构—供应商的冗长委托代理链条。采购人—采购机构—供应商三方的行为实质是一种供应链契约,由于信息不对称这样的委托代理会产生机会主义和合谋行为。本文主要研究政府采购中“采购机构—供应商”“采购机构内部”间的机会主义行为,重点分析采购机构的设租行为与供应商的寻租行为、采购机构内部的共谋行为、供应商的事前与事后机会主义行为的形成机制。
Government procurement is an important means for the government to realize its administrative functions. It is usually implemented by the government using the market-oriented public procurement process from the private sector. This forms the lengthy principal-agent chain of the taxpayer-government-procurement agency-supplier. Procurers - Procurement agencies - suppliers The three parties act in essence is a supply chain contract, due to asymmetric information such a proxy agent will produce opportunism and collusion. This paper mainly studies the opportunistic behavior in government procurement, such as purchasing agency, supplier, procurement agency, and other aspects, focusing on the rent-seeking behavior of the purchasing agency and the rent-seeking behavior of the supplier, the conspiracy within the purchasing agency Behavior, the formation mechanism of suppliers’ ex ante and post opportunism behavior.