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本文从消费者策略行为出发,通过运用经典的Stackelberg博弈模型,讨论面对消费者策略行为时,短生命周期产品厂商如何有效进行收益管理。结论表明,在短生命周期产品收益管理过程中,忽视消费者策略行为会导致利润的严重损失,厂商应根据库存和消费者的理性预期制定相应的价格决策。当库存较少时,厂商基本可以忽略消费者策略行为而制定较高价格;当库存相对较多,厂商的最优定价决策依赖于理性预期均衡;当库存非常充裕时,最优定价决策与消费者折扣因子紧密相关。厂商可通过适当的库存数量增加产品缺货风险,而减少消费者策略行为的不利影响。这对短生命周期产品的收益管理具有一定的现实意义。
In this paper, starting from the behavior of consumers, through the use of the classic Stackelberg game model, the short life cycle product manufacturers how to effectively carry out revenue management when facing the consumer strategy behavior. The conclusion shows that in the process of short life cycle product revenue management, ignoring the consumer behavior will result in a serious loss of profits. Manufacturers should formulate corresponding price decisions based on inventory and consumers’ rational expectations. When the inventory is low, the manufacturer can basically ignore the consumer behavior and formulate higher prices. When the inventory is relatively large, the optimal pricing decision of the manufacturer depends on the rational expectation equilibrium. When the inventory is abundant, the optimal pricing decision and consumption Discount factor is closely related. Manufacturers can reduce the risk of product out-of-stock with the appropriate stock quantity to reduce the adverse effects of consumer tactics. This has certain practical significance for the revenue management of short life cycle products.