论文部分内容阅读
上市公司董事会、监事会等内部机关的设置是实现内部制衡的重要机制,相互之间必然会产生利益冲突,但倡导“凡诉必立”完全承认内部诉讼或以传统的诉讼当事人资格理论完全否认内部诉讼关系都过于绝对。从利益衡量以及机关的制衡策略设计角度而言,我国未来公司审判实践中只应该承认监事会对董事会,以及监事对董事会在特定条件下具有诉讼当事人资格,而董事会对监事会,以及这两类机关的成员对所属机关都不应该具有诉讼当事人资格。
The establishment of internal organs such as the board of directors and board of supervisors of listed companies is an important mechanism to achieve internal checks and balances and conflicts of interest will inevitably arise among each other. However, the advocacy of “Where v. Will ” fully admit that the internal litigation or the traditional litigant eligibility theory completely Denied that the internal litigation relationship is too absolute. From the point of view of interest measurement and the design of countervailing and balancing mechanism, the trial practice of our country’s future company should only recognize that the board of supervisors should have the qualification of litigant under certain conditions for the board of directors and the supervisors, and the board of supervisors and the two types of organs Members should not have the litigants eligible for their respective agencies.