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Recently， with the publication of the book Nudge， the “nudge” theory has become one of the hottest topics in political fields. In the book， the authors Thaler and Sunstein push out the design of ‘libertarian paternalism’， which is to push people into better choices without limitation of their liberty， and suggest a few ways how governments and other organizations can nudge individuals. The standpoints in the book attract much attention， and at the same time， deserve further reconsideration.
To start with， there exists deficiency in the concept of nudge given by Thaler and Sunstein. They define nudge to require such minimum costs from choosers that their liberties would not be violated. However， several examples given by them to illustrate nudge belie the definition. For instance， they write that the demand for firms to publish “Toxic Release Inventories” “is a nice example of a social nudge” （p.191/193）， which permits the media to produce “environmental blacklists” （p.191/193） Although the governments are not pressuring firms to do anything except reveal what dangerous chemical stored or released into the environment by them， the demand makes possible for social penalty on pollution. Asking the publication of poisonous release was effectual， because it increased the pollution charge.
Similarly， the problem exists in the definition of paternalism. They define a policy as paternalistic “if it tries to influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off， as judged by themselves” （p.5）， which means the only things to differentiate paternalism from general beneficence are that， firstly， the aim of paternalism is to benefit people by helping them make smarter decisions instead of supporting advantages in other ways； secondly， the choosers are supposed to approve of their decisions. The definition is disappointing， because it means whether agents agree that the intercession profits them has nothing to do with whether the intercession is paternalistic. What is more， in the definition， paternalism is not set to influence choices as purpose.
Except these confusions on the core concepts in nudge theory， the limits of the government’s implementation of nudge which form decisions should also be discussed.
First of all， in many occasions， no matter if there is a nudge， people’s decisions would be formed by several factors such as thinking skeleton， living bias and myopia. Although shaping still take effects due to the likelihood of one agent in charge of another， it possibly makes the actions no less the agent’s own， when the agent might have been subject to indistinguishable weakness in the absence of nudges. When decision forming is inevitable， it must be allowable. Secondly， although advised by a comprehension of human choice-making foibles， nudges such as “cooling off periods” and “mandated choice” referred in the book， only prevent foibles in choice-making without in any ways to push people into one choice instead of another. From this view， shaping apparently increase rather than decrease one’s ability to make decisions rationally.
Thirdly， people are supposed to discriminate between occasions when shaping enlarges the extent to which one’s choice is twisted by flaws in consideration， and occasions when choice-making would be at least as twisted without any deliberately designed choice architecture. In several situations， such as subconscious advertisement， the foibles that make people care less about brushing their teeth are less of a danger to their abilities to make decisions well for themselves than nudges.
Besides the limits above existing in reality when we discuss whether to nudge or not to nudge， a few broader claims should also not be ignored， which are not only limited within nudge. Firstly， government behaviors to shape individuals’ choices are liable to abuse： it is feasible by means of shaping to lead individuals to make their decisions that are at odds with the settled favors and with the favors they could express if their consideration was not faulty. Secondly， publicity is important. One crucial way to go against abuse and keep respects for autonomy is to ensure that governments actually notify people of attempts to form their choices. Thirdly， the findings of behavioral economists and psychologists about the characters of flaws in our deliberative abilities remind us of their frailty and the need to caring for them. And when governments deliberately employ non-rational means of persuasion， it should take care not to reduce the ability to convince people rationally.
To start with， there exists deficiency in the concept of nudge given by Thaler and Sunstein. They define nudge to require such minimum costs from choosers that their liberties would not be violated. However， several examples given by them to illustrate nudge belie the definition. For instance， they write that the demand for firms to publish “Toxic Release Inventories” “is a nice example of a social nudge” （p.191/193）， which permits the media to produce “environmental blacklists” （p.191/193） Although the governments are not pressuring firms to do anything except reveal what dangerous chemical stored or released into the environment by them， the demand makes possible for social penalty on pollution. Asking the publication of poisonous release was effectual， because it increased the pollution charge.
Similarly， the problem exists in the definition of paternalism. They define a policy as paternalistic “if it tries to influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off， as judged by themselves” （p.5）， which means the only things to differentiate paternalism from general beneficence are that， firstly， the aim of paternalism is to benefit people by helping them make smarter decisions instead of supporting advantages in other ways； secondly， the choosers are supposed to approve of their decisions. The definition is disappointing， because it means whether agents agree that the intercession profits them has nothing to do with whether the intercession is paternalistic. What is more， in the definition， paternalism is not set to influence choices as purpose.
Except these confusions on the core concepts in nudge theory， the limits of the government’s implementation of nudge which form decisions should also be discussed.
First of all， in many occasions， no matter if there is a nudge， people’s decisions would be formed by several factors such as thinking skeleton， living bias and myopia. Although shaping still take effects due to the likelihood of one agent in charge of another， it possibly makes the actions no less the agent’s own， when the agent might have been subject to indistinguishable weakness in the absence of nudges. When decision forming is inevitable， it must be allowable. Secondly， although advised by a comprehension of human choice-making foibles， nudges such as “cooling off periods” and “mandated choice” referred in the book， only prevent foibles in choice-making without in any ways to push people into one choice instead of another. From this view， shaping apparently increase rather than decrease one’s ability to make decisions rationally.
Thirdly， people are supposed to discriminate between occasions when shaping enlarges the extent to which one’s choice is twisted by flaws in consideration， and occasions when choice-making would be at least as twisted without any deliberately designed choice architecture. In several situations， such as subconscious advertisement， the foibles that make people care less about brushing their teeth are less of a danger to their abilities to make decisions well for themselves than nudges.
Besides the limits above existing in reality when we discuss whether to nudge or not to nudge， a few broader claims should also not be ignored， which are not only limited within nudge. Firstly， government behaviors to shape individuals’ choices are liable to abuse： it is feasible by means of shaping to lead individuals to make their decisions that are at odds with the settled favors and with the favors they could express if their consideration was not faulty. Secondly， publicity is important. One crucial way to go against abuse and keep respects for autonomy is to ensure that governments actually notify people of attempts to form their choices. Thirdly， the findings of behavioral economists and psychologists about the characters of flaws in our deliberative abilities remind us of their frailty and the need to caring for them. And when governments deliberately employ non-rational means of persuasion， it should take care not to reduce the ability to convince people rationally.