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叔本华与尼采在道德观上的基本诉求可以说是正相反。前者认为道德主体对包括弱者在内的他人利益的关切或同情是道德唯一合法的动机,而后者则主张摈除以同情、怜悯、宽恕为特征的奴隶道德,代之以征服、压迫、索取为特征的主人道德。叔本华同情伦理学的根据在于人类的同情本能,而尼采的强者伦理学的根据在于其基于利己主义的视角主义道德观。从现代伦理学的视角来看,尼采忽视或否定人类的同情本能,说明其对人性或人类本能的认识并不客观全面。而叔本华凸显同情本能的作用从现代伦理学的观点来看是十分合理的,他对人类同情本能的理解非常接近现代社会科学和自然科学的相关研究。但是叔本华将包括相互性原则在内的任何形式的利己因素完全排除在道德的范畴之外,并不符合人类道德进化的实际。从现代伦理学的视角对叔本华、尼采伦理学中的视角主义道德观、同情道德观以及相互性原则进行分析,可以让我们更加清楚地看到人类本性中利己和利他两个向度在人类道德中所起的作用。
The basic demands of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche on morality can be said to be the opposite. The former holds that the moral subject’s concern or sympathy for the interests of others, including the weak, is the only moral motivation for morality, while the latter advocates the removal of the morality of slaves, which is characterized by compassion, compassion and forgiveness, and is replaced by conquering, oppressing, Characteristics of the host morality. Schopenhayer’s sympathetic ethics is based on human sympathy instincts, and Nietzsche’s strong ethics is based on his own egotisticalist perspective ethics. From the perspective of modern ethics, Nietzsche neglected or negated the sympathetic instinct of human beings, indicating that his understanding of human nature or human instinct is not objective and comprehensive. The role of Schopenhauer in highlighting the sympathetic instinct is quite reasonable from the point of view of modern ethics. His understanding of the human instinct of sympathy for human beings is very close to that of modern social sciences and natural sciences. However, Schopenhauer completely excludes any form of self-interest, including the principle of reciprocity, from the category of morality and does not conform to the actual evolution of human morality. From the perspective of modern ethics, analyzing Schopenhauer’s and Nietzschean ethics of perspective, the concept of sympathy and morality and the principle of reciprocity can make us see more clearly the two dimensions of self-interest and altruism in human nature The role of human morality.