本文旨在评估美国资本市场选择性披露管制的政策影响。通过对后FD时期系列经验研究的回顾,本文归纳了研究管制影响的实证模型构建所面临的困难,系统梳理了现有文献的经验证据。总体上,实施FD条例后,公司管理层公开披露增加,市场分析师的意见价值下降,而市场流动性或有效性方面不存在一致证据,也几乎不存在可以辨别的投资者表现的变化。因此,经验研究似乎表明,监管层对选择性披露削弱投资者信心的担心与批评者对新规则抑制市场信息流动的担忧均是过度的。 This article aims to assess the policy implications of selective disclosure controls in US capital markets. Through the review of the series of post-FD period empirical research, this paper summarizes the difficulties in establishing the empirical model for the study of regulatory impact and systematically reviews the empirical evidence of the existing literature. In general, after the implementation of the FD regulations, there has been an increase in public disclosure by the management of the Company and a decrease in the value of market analysts’ opinions. There is no unanimous evidence on the market liquidity or effectiveness and there is almost no change in discernable investor performance. Thus, empirical studies seem to indicate that regulators ’concerns about selective disclosure weakening investor confidence and critics’ over-speculation about the new rules inhibiting the flow of market information are both excessive.