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日军投降不久,新四军第二师师长兼政委黄克诚奉命率第三师主力一部到淮南津浦路西,与新四军第二师会合,以阻止国民党桂系部队东进。1945年9月13日回师苏北途中,黄克诚知道苏联红军已占领东北,我军已有少数部队进入东北。他以个人名义向中央和军委发电报,提出他对当前局势及军事方针的意见和建说:一、蒋介石对和平谈判毫无诚意,我们不能对和谈抱有幻想,应当立足于打,在与蒋和谈的同时,应集中精力准备决战。二、取得连成一片的大战略根据地,有利于进行长期斗争。在军事部署
Shortly after the Japanese surrendered, the second division of the New Fourth Army and political commissar Huang Kecheng were instructed to rate the third division’s main force to the west of Jinpu Road in Huainan and join the second division of the New Fourth Army to prevent the KMT forces of the Kuomintang going eastward. On September 13, 1945, on the way back to northern Jiangsu, Huang Kecheng knew that the Soviet Red Army had occupied the northeast and that a small number of our troops had entered the northeast. In his own name, he telegraphed the Central Military Commission and the CMC and put forward his opinions and proposals on the current situation and military policy: First, since Chiang Kai-shek has no sincerity in peace negotiations, we can not have any illusions about peace talks. He should base ourselves on fighting, At the same time as Chiang peace talks, we should concentrate on preparing for decisive battle. Second, obtaining a major strategic base of succession will be conducive to long-term struggle. In the military deployment