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意志是行为者导向有意图行为的心理机能或精神功能,它表现为行为者内心关于做某事的抉择,通常被认为受行为者的自我决定因而是自由的。在思想史上,古希腊的理性哲学、基督教的神学体系、德国观念论的启蒙哲学乃至后启蒙时代的存在主义哲学,都曾为作为意志自决或意志自律的意志自由概念提供论证。但是,这些论证均无法彻底回避和消除决定论尤其是社会文化决定论的可能。所以,我们只能在一个广义的相容论框架内来考虑这个概念。意志自由不在于意志自决,而在于行为者总可以对自决或不自决的意志进行再度评判、调控或修正,予以相应的促进或阻止,并提供意志诉求的其他可能。意志自由是对意志自决的反思和反作用,它应当在意志自决之反身性的意义上被理解。
Will is the behavioral or mental function of the actor’s intentional behavior. It manifests itself in the choices made by the actor in his heart and is generally considered to be free by the self-determination of the actor. In the history of thoughts, the rational philosophy of ancient Greece, the Christian theological system, the enlightenment philosophy of German conceptualism and even the post-Enlightenment existentialist philosophy all provided arguments for the concept of will-free as self-determination or self-discipline. However, these arguments can not completely evade and eliminate the possibility of determinism, especially social and cultural determinism. Therefore, we can only consider this concept in the framework of a generalized compatibility theory. Will-freedom is not about self-determination, but rather that actors can always re-evaluate, regulate or amend the will to self-determination or self-determination, promote or stop them accordingly, and provide other possibilities for their will. Free will is the reflection and reaction to the will to self-determination, and it should be understood in the sense of reflexiveness of self-determination.