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国有企业异质性股东的存在导致其面临更加复杂的产权关系。本文从委托代理关系中参与人的风险规避视角出发,试图厘清委托代理理论从单边道德风险模型到双边道德风险模型的演进脉络,并提出国有企业异质性委托情境下的包括政府股东、社会股东与国企高管在内的三边道德风险理论框架,以期为三边道德风险模型的拓展提供理论基础。
The existence of heterogeneous shareholders of SOEs causes them to face more complicated property rights. This paper attempts to clarify the evolution of the principal-agent theory from the unilateral moral hazard model to the bilateral moral hazard model from the perspective of the participants’ risk aversion in the principal-agent relationship, and puts forward the evolution of the principal- Shareholders and state-owned high-level moral hazard theory framework, with a view to providing a theoretical basis for the expansion of the three-sided moral hazard model.