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亚里士多德很早就指出了理性的无能。在他看来,在柏拉图的哲学中被确定为我们能够正确把握实在世界的理性洞察的能力,实际上只是一种理论思维的能力,它在具体的实践生活中所能发挥的作用是非常有限的。今天,认知主义伦理学似乎还是用程序性的道德自我切断了自我与其自身内在的自然本性不可分的联系(它回避了亚里士多德的理性的无能的问题),而本体论伦理学以文化—伦理具有自我解释的功能为由,整个地否定了反思性的自我的特殊性(它走向了一种彻底的还原论)。因此,本文认为,有必要从方法论上入手:一方面对道德自我的形成重新做出一种非本体论的评价,另一方面对认知主义的程序理性思维进行批判,以便对处于历史的自然秩序中的自我做出正确的规定。
Aristotle pointed out the incompetence of reason long ago. In his opinion, the ability of Plato’s philosophy to define us as capable of correctly grasping the real world’s rational insight is in fact only a capacity for theoretical thinking, and its role in concrete practical life is very limited of. Today, cognitive ethics seems to have cut off, with procedural moral self, the connection between self and its own internal natural nature (which sidesteps Aristotle’s question of incompetence), while ontological ethics Culture-ethics has the function of self-explanation, which totally negates the peculiarities of the reflective self (which leads to a complete reductionism). Therefore, this paper argues that it is necessary to start from the methodology: on the one hand, to make a non-ontological assessment of the formation of moral self; on the other hand, to critique the rational thinking of the procedure of cognition so that the historical nature Order in the self to make the right rules.