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本文从财政税收体制和地方官员政绩考核机制两个方面实证检验了土地财政既是地方政府的一种“无奈”选择,更是一种“冲动”行为。要改变这种状况就要“标本兼治”:治“标”不仅要改变目前地方财权事权不匹配的财税分配制度,还要彻底改变目前以经济增长为核心的官员政绩考核机制,建设“服务型政府”;治“本”是在确保农村土地集体所有制的前提下,首先保证农民对土地享有永久使用权;其次建立城乡统筹的土地交易市场,让农民获取土地增值收入,保护农民利益。
This paper tests empirically from two aspects: the fiscal tax system and the local officials’ performance appraisal mechanism. Land finance is not only a kind of “helplessness” choice of local governments, but also an “impulse” behavior. To change this situation, we must not only change the fiscal and taxation allocation system that does not match the current local power and power rights, but also completely change the current performance appraisal mechanism of officials with economic growth as the core. In the premise of ensuring the collective ownership of rural land, the government should first ensure that peasants enjoy permanent use of land; secondly, establish a market for land transactions that is coordinated by both urban and rural areas so that peasants can obtain land appreciation Income, protect the interests of farmers.