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具有偿债能力的中小企业因缺乏偿债意愿而导致联保贷款违约的事件屡见不鲜,中小企业的偿债意愿已成为联保贷款模式能否正常运行的关键所在。本文从行为科学的视角,利用EWA模型刻画联保贷款组织内中小企业还款策略选择行为的学习机制,并基于多智能体仿真方法比较了“收益比较机制”和“EWA学习机制”两种学习机制对联保贷款组织内中小企业还款策略选择行为的影响。实验结果表明:(1)EWA学习机制更加贴近现实情况,中小企业联保贷款信用风险的管控应该软性引导与硬性奖惩双管齐下;(2)存在最优的联保贷款组织规模使得组织内成员企业选择违约策略的比例达到较低水平,进而实现将信用风险控制在较低水平的目的。
Because of the lack of willingness to pay debts, SMEs with solvency problems are not uncommon in the event of the default of UNPROFOR loans. The solvency of SMEs has become the key to the successful operation of the UNPROFOR loan model. From the perspective of behavioral science, this paper uses the EWA model to describe the learning mechanism of SMEs’ repayment strategy selection behavior in UNPROFOR. Based on the multi-agent simulation method, this paper compares the “return comparison mechanism” and “EWA learning mechanism” The Impact of Two Learning Mechanisms on the Choice of Repayment Strategies for SMEs in UNPROFOR Loans. The experimental results show that: (1) EWA learning mechanism is more close to the reality, the SME loan guarantee risk control should be softly guided and hard rewards and punishment two-pronged approach; (2) there is the optimal size of UNPROFOR loan organization allows members of the organization The proportion of the policy of choosing to default to a lower level, thus achieving the purpose of controlling the credit risk at a relatively low level.