为揭示非封闭式收费公路逃费的本质原因,规避逃费行为,运用博弈理论和期望矩阵模型对逃费现象进行分析。分析认为:在现有约束条件下,逃费者和参与逃费的村民、管理者在相互博弈中共谋逃费是其利益的最优选择。分析结果表明,治理逃费的根本途径在于降低公路收费标准,深化监管体制改革,科学布局公路收费站点。 In order to reveal the essential reasons of non-closed toll road escape and evade fleeing behavior, the phenomenon of fleeing flight was analyzed by using game theory and expectation matrix model. According to the analysis, under the existing constraints, the escapees and the villagers and managers participating in the escaping charges are the best choices of their interest in conspiring to seek their own expenses in the mutual game. The analysis results show that the fundamental way to govern fleeing is to lower the standard of highway toll, deepen the reform of the regulatory system, and layout the highway toll sites scientifically.