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本文考察在我国的IPO行政审批制度下,投行的政治联系如何影响其监督和认证功能的发挥。通过建立投行和企业双边匹配模型,以2008—2011年民营IPO为样本研究发现:均衡状态下,盈余质量好的IPO与有政治联系的投行匹配,盈余质量差的IPO与没有政治联系的投行匹配,表明有政治联系的投行并未通过政治寻租帮助盈余质量差的IPO发行上市,相反,他们凭借在掌握监管规则方面的优势吸引客户,然后从中选择质量好的IPO并加以严格监督和认证。上述结论与关于中介政治联系的制度知识假说一致,但不支持游说假说。
This article examines how the political connection of investment banks affects the function of supervision and certification under the IPO examination and approval system in our country. Through the establishment of a bilateral matchmaking model between investment banks and enterprises, a sample of private IPO from 2008 to 2011 was used to find out: In the equilibrium state, the IPO with good earnings quality matches the investment banks with political connections, the IPO with poor earnings quality matches the investment banks with no political connections , Suggesting that politically connected investment banks have not helped IPO with poor earnings quality through political rent-seeking. Instead, they attract customers by taking advantage of regulatory rules and then select good-quality IPOs from which they can be carefully supervised and certified. The above conclusion is consistent with the institutional knowledge hypothesis about the political connection of intermediaries, but it does not support the lobbying hypothesis.