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在双渠道闭环供应链中考虑零售商具有公平偏好行为倾向,基于博弈理论研究了制造商考虑零售商公平偏好和不考虑零售商公平偏好的双渠道闭环供应链定价决策问题。结果发现,零售商的公平偏好行为对供应链各成员的最优定价策略和利润均有影响;与零售商不具有公平偏好相比,当零售商具有公平偏好时,如果制造商考虑这种公平偏好将增强零售商在双渠道闭环供应链中的讨价还价能力,这有利于增加零售商利润,但会减少制造商利润,而如果制造商忽视零售商的这种公平偏好将导致双方利润均减少;当零售商具有公平偏好时,处于主导地位的制造商应该关注这种公平偏好行为,从而避免双渠道闭环供应链系统效率的损失。
Considering retailers have fair preference behavior in double-channel closed-loop supply chain, this paper studies the decision-making of double-channel closed-loop supply chain pricing with manufacturer’s consideration of retailer’s fair preference and retailer’s fair preference based on game theory. The results show that the retailer’s fair preference behavior has an impact on the optimal pricing strategy and profit of each member in the supply chain. When the retailer has fair preference compared to the retailer does not have the fair preference, if the manufacturer considers such fairness The preference will enhance the retailers’ bargaining power in the double-channel closed-loop supply chain, which will help to increase the retailer’s profit, but will reduce the manufacturer’s profit. However, if the manufacturer ignores the retailer’s fair preference, the profits of both parties will decrease. When retailers have a fair preference, the dominant manufacturers should pay attention to this kind of fair preference behavior, so as to avoid the loss of efficiency of the double-channel closed-loop supply chain system.