运用激励理论分析政府与公交企业之间的委托代理关系,从激励公交企业提高服务水平的角度出发,构建了信息不对称条件下政府与城市公交企业的委托代理模型,证明了政府合适的补贴机制可以激励城市公交企业优化服务水平,为政府对企业进行补贴激励决策提供了理论依据。 Using incentive theory to analyze the principal-agent relationship between government and public transport enterprises, from the perspective of encouraging public transport enterprises to improve their service level, this paper constructs the principal-agent model of government and urban public transport enterprises under the condition of information asymmetry and proves that the government’s appropriate subsidy mechanism It can stimulate the urban public transport enterprises to optimize the service level and provide a theoretical basis for the government to subsidize the enterprises.