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农村防灾减灾能力建设的政府资金投入体系中中央政府和不同的地方政府之间的博弈可以看作是中央政府和地方政府、地方政府和地方政府之间的两个层次的进化博弈.通过建立三方进化博弈模型来分析博弈达到均衡的过程,试图建立农村防灾减灾能力建设中政府资金投入的激励机制.根据分析结果可以得出两点启示:应将农村防灾减灾能力的强弱纳入地方政府政绩考核评价体系当中;地方政府进行农村防灾减灾能力建设的资金利用效率会影响到博弈的最终均衡.
The game between the central government and different local governments in the system of government funds for building disaster prevention and reduction capacity in rural areas can be regarded as two levels of evolutionary game between the central government and local governments, local governments and local governments Tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the equilibrium process of the game to try to establish the incentive mechanism for the government capital investment in the construction of disaster prevention and mitigation capacity in rural areas.According to the analysis results, two enlightenments can be drawn: the strength of disaster prevention and mitigation should be incorporated into the rural areas Government performance appraisal system; local government funds for the construction of capacity for disaster prevention and mitigation in rural areas will affect the efficiency of the final balance of the game.