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文章基于动态权衡理论,以1999-2014年上市公司为样本,运用混合所有制改革这一“自然实验”条件,研究了高管股权激励对其融资决策中防御行为的影响,分离出激励和治理双重效应。研究发现:(1)股权激励有助于抑制高管融资决策中的防御行为,但这种效应只存在于民营企业中;(2)对于国有企业,只在股权分置改革后才观察到类似效果,而股改前高管在减少债务融资的同时,提高了股权激励水平,自我激励问题明显;(3)公司股权混合度越高,其在赋予高管股权激励上越谨慎,但在国有股比例较高的公司中,混合所有制改革显著提高了股权激励水平;(4)股权混合安排显著改进了股权激励契约在抑制高管防御行为方面的效率,这种效应在非国有股比例较高的公司中更强。
Based on the dynamic trade-off theory and the listed companies from 1999 to 2014 as a sample, this paper uses the “natural experiment” condition of mixed ownership reform to study the impact of executive incentive on the defensive behavior of its financing decision, Governance double effect. The findings are as follows: (1) Equity incentive helps to restrain defensive behavior in senior management financing decision, but this effect exists only in private enterprises; (2) For state-owned enterprises, it is observed only after the split share structure reform While the senior management before the share reform reduced the debt financing at the same time, raising the level of equity incentives, self-motivation is obvious; (3) the higher the company’s equity mix, the more cautious on the incentive to give executives equity incentives, but the proportion of state-owned shares (4) Equity pooling arrangements significantly improve the efficiency of equity incentive contracts in restraining senior executives’ defense behavior. This effect is even more obvious in companies with higher proportion of non-state-owned shares Strong.