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组织内控制权分配是一项契约安排,合理的控制权分配可以节约组织内的交易成本。一个可以观察到的趋势是,经济学家越来越关注于组织内控制权或者权威的研究,试图通过对组织内控制权或权威的探讨来研究提高组织绩效的方向。企业组织里的权威或者控制权是可以转让的,控制权分配发生于组织内的委托人和代理人之间,具体而言是发生在组织内的领导和下属之间。一个不断困扰经济学家及其他学者的重要问题是:组织内的控制权是如何分配的?沿着这样一个总体思路,本文从以下几个角度深入分析和评述了组织内的控制权分配理论的进展:(1)显示原理;(2)通讯成本与契约复杂性;(3)信息处理;(4)串谋;(5)再谈判与不完全契约。这些理论总结将有助于深入研究组织设计以及决策效率等现代企业理论中的关键问题。
The distribution of control rights within an organization is a contractual arrangement, and reasonable allocation of control can save the transaction costs within the organization. One observable trend is that economists are increasingly concerned with the study of control or authority within an organization and are trying to find ways to improve organizational performance by examining the control or authority within the organization. The authority or control in the business organization is transferable, and the distribution of control occurs between the principal and the agent in the organization, specifically between the leaders and subordinates in the organization. An important question constantly troubling economists and other scholars is: How to control the distribution of rights within the organization? Along such a general train of thought, this article from the following perspectives in-depth analysis and evaluation of the theory of control distribution within the organization Progress: (1) display principle; (2) communication costs and contract complexity; (3) information processing; (4) collusion; (5) renegotiation and incomplete contracts. These theoretical summaries will help to further examine the key issues in modern business theory, such as organizational design and decision-making efficiency.