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Research Fellow， Director of the Middle East Research Institute，
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
During the Cold War， the United States implemented an “offshore balance” policy in the Middle East， on the one hand， competing with the Soviet Union for a sphere of influence， and on the other hand， not directly engaging in the war. After the end of the Cold War， the US， as the sole super power， switched to the strategy of direct intervention in the Middle East. It launched two large-scale regional wars and put forward the “Plan on Democratic Reform of Great Middle East”. Marked by the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011， the US strategy toward Middle East entered a new period， which is the period of strategic transformation. Since entering the transformation period， the US Middle East strategy has shown inconsistency and capriciousness repeatedly. Looking back at the words and deeds of the Democrats and the Republicans as well as the American presidents， some basic characteristics of this strategic transformation period can be summed up.
Characteristics of Transformation Period of US strategy
toward Middle East
The transformation of the U.S Middle East strategy is a “reflection” on its large-scale military intervention in the 21st century. The US Middle East strategy has partly returned to the “normal” of “offshore balance”， and abandoning large-scale military intervention has become a bipartisan consensus in the US Congress. In specific， the transformation period of the US strategy toward Middle East is characterized by the following aspects.
First， large-scale military intervention， once the backbone of the US strategy toward Middle East， has been shelved and is likely to be abandoned in the future. The US dispatched troops of 530，000 people to the 1991 Gulf War and those of 160，000 to the 2003 Iraq War， yet this situation is unlikely to recur. In 2011， the then US Defense Secretary Robert Gates mentioned in his address at the West Point that it was already over to invade， occupy and liberate a country as part of America’s Middle East strategy. Since June 2019， US drones have been shot down by Iran， Saudi oil fields have been attacked， and US military bases have suffered from Iranian missile raid， yet the US has resorted to massive retaliation on none of those. This shows， from Obama to Trump， unless Americans or American property are directly and seriously attacked， the US is not likely to launch another large-scale war in the Middle East， which constitutes the most important and prominent change in the transformation period of the US strategy toward the Middle East. Second， exporting western democratic models， which used to be another pillar of US Middle East strategy for a long time， has been shelved by the Trump administration. On the ideological front， the US will never abandon the exportation of western democratic ideas. Yet， the era of the US exporting western democratic models to the Middle East as an operational policy or systematic strategy is ending. Since 2006， the US has enthusiastically supported the democratic elections in Palestine， Egypt， Tunisia， Libya， Iraq and Yemen， but almost all of them have ended with disastrous consequences. In the face of the painful lessons， the US has changed its policy. The year 2019 witnessed the outbreak of the so-called “second wave of Arab Spring” in the Middle East， with large-scale demonstrations in countries including Algeria， Sudan， Iraq and Lebanon， the national leaders of which were forced to step down. Contrary to its usual practice， the US neither offered political support to the opposition， nor deeply engaged in the internal affairs of the countries concerned.
Third， the US confidence in building peace in the Middle East has been seriously undermined， its willingness to support basic and constructive long-term planning declined， and its emphasis on transactional and ad hoc work has been increasing. In the past decade， the US has not led the peace process in Syria， Yemen and Libya， nor has it actively participated in the post-war reconstruction of the relevant countries. Its willingness and action to invest in social stability and economic development in key countries such as Egypt， Jordan， Iraq and Lebanon have both declined. While the US retains the US$1.3 billion annual military aid to Egypt， its economic aid has been reduced from US$800 million two decades ago to today’s US$120 million. On the Palestine-Israel issue， the US has cancelled most of its aids to Palestine and has almost stopped all supportive actions. The US closed its consulate in the southern Iraqi city of Basra in September 2018 and withdrew all non-military personnel in Iraq in early 2020 due to the deteriorating security situation. Those measures may become permanent arrangements.
Fourth， the US chooses not to engage in large-scale ground operations while to increase air intervention， with the intention of leading Middle East affairs with zero casualties. Although the US has not been directly involved in ground operations in the Middle East since 2011， it has never been absent from the Middle East battlefield. It has been engaged in the air and on the shore. It provided air force in the NATO-led war in Libya， which overthrew the Qaddafi regime. It assisted and trained Syrian opposition forces to form and lead an international coalition against “IS” extremist groups. The US also sent ground troops back to Iraq and air forces targeting terrorist forces in Libya and Yemen. On January 3， 2020， the US army exerted a targeted killing to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s Holy City Brigade Commander Soleimani. This “light print” type of military intervention will become the major way for US future intervention in the Middle East. Fifth， the US will not reduce its investment by a large margin in the Middle East in a short term， and will remain the most influential external country in the Middle East for a long time to come. Although the US is withdrawing its combat troops from the Middle East hotspots， its garrison and military bases in the Middle East are still maintained. At present， the US garrison in the Middle East total about 60，000 to 80，000， and it maintains two aircraft carrier battle groups. US arms sales to the Middle East in 2019 totaled US$25.5 billion， accounting for one-third of its global total （US$69.7 million）. For many years， the Middle East has been the biggest beneficiary of the US aid， taking about 35% of all its foreign aid. The US has been frequently involved in hotspot issues in the Middle East by comprehensive means of air strikes， military deterrence， arms sales， military assistance， alignment and mutual assistance. The Trump administration exercising “extreme pressure” on Iran， the formation of a “Middle-East version of NATO”， the launch of the so-called “century agreement” to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict， the mediation of the “Eastern Mediterranean Alliance”， and the mediation of Saudi relations with Qatar， all these together further highlight the strengthening of the US presence in the Middle East.
Changing US Interests
in Middle East
The Obama administration summed up in 2011 the US interests in the Middle East as follows： energy， counter-terrorism， preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction， and protecting Israel’s security and promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The US interests in the Middle East have been concentrated on the four areas for several decades and rarely disputed， yet the priorities among the four are changing. Although many in the US admit that the importance of the Middle East to the US has declined， there is no consensus on the extent of the decline.
Middle East oil is less important now. Theoretically， the US has emerged from its dependence on Middle East oil and achieved the so-called “energy independence”. Trump said on January 8， 2020， that the US has become the world’s largest oil and gas producer， achieving energy independence and no longer in need of the Middle East oil. The US achieved a daily production of 15.3 million barrels of liquid oil in 2018， listed the world first. In September 2019， it achieved monthly net exports of oil. According to the US Energy Information Agency estimate， the US will be a stable net exporter of oil in 2020. In this sense， the US does achieve its energy independence. But in fact， the US still needs to import heavy crude oil from the Middle East. In 2001， the US imported 2.8 million barrels of crude oil from the Middle East per day， accounting for 23% of its gross daily imports of crude oil， which were 11.9 million barrels. In comparison， its daily imports of crude oil from the Middle East in 2019 were 900 thousand barrels， accounting for 9% of its gross imports of 8 million barrels per day. It can be seen that the US still needs Middle East oil， though both the absolute and relative shares of imports have declined. At the same time， US oil price is still affected by the Middle East situation， yet increasingly limited. Structurally， Middle East oil is less important in international oil market than it was. Middle East oil exports accounted for 50% of the world total in 1980， yet only 35% in 2018. In terms of perspective， with an oversupply of oil in international market in the next few years， the impact of oil production fluctuations in the Middle East will be weakened. However， since 21% of global oil consumption goes through the Strait of Hormuz， any turbulence in the Persian Gulf is bound to impact international oil prices. Overall， the importance of the Middle East to the US energy security has declined considerably compared with that of a decade ago. However， the Middle East oil remains significant to the US， with one-fifth of the world oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz and the oil producers in the Middle East providing one-third of the global oil exports as well as most of the world’s mobile production capacity. The change in the importance of the Middle East oil to the US is the focus of controversy in the transformation period of the US strategy toward the Middle East.
It is one of the fundamental interests of the US to protect the security of Israel， the most reliable ally of the US in the Middle East and also known as the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” of the US in the Middle East. Since the third Middle East War in 1967， the US has become the strongest supporter of Israel， and the US-Israeli alliance has become increasingly clear， and special relations gradually formed. During the Cold War， the US and the Soviet Union fought a “minor Cold War” in the Middle East， and Israel rushed to the front line to contain the Soviet Camp states such as Egypt， Syria and Iraq. With the end of the Cold War， the status of Israel as a bridgehead of the Cold War changed into a vanguard of the US to block Iran and fight terrorism. However， the significance of Israel to the US was once again questioned in terms of both real interests and ideology. In terms of real interests， American neo-realist theoretician Millsheimer believes that it is because of the US one-sided support for Israel that terrorist organizations and Iran resent and oppose the US， so Israel is a major reason for the US becoming a terrorist target. Taking Israel as an important anti-terrorist and anti-Iran ally is like putting the cart before the horse. Therefore， abandoning the special relationship between the US and Israel is the most effective anti-terrorism measure. In terms of ideology， in recent years， a growing number of American liberals have been dissatisfied with Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestine， discrimination against its own Arabs and the strengthening of its Jewish attributes， which all run counter to the democratic values that the US agrees to and fade Israel’s “democratic image”. Israel， which used to enjoy unanimous support from both parties in the US， is now a subject of partisan controversy， with the overwhelming majority of Republicans supporting it， while the new Democratic left opposes supporting it. Changing Objectives
of US Middle East Strategy
Interest serves as the basis on which the goal is determined， and the change of interest leads to the change of the goal. US fundamental interest in the Middle East is energy security. If the importance of the Middle East energy to the US falls， all of the above-mentioned four goals will be undermined， and that is the root cause of the current uncertainties in the strategic objectives of the US in the Middle East.
First， it is the primary goal of US Middle East strategy to protect the safety of its own personnel and property. At present， the US military forces deployed in the Middle East have about 100，000 people （including regular military personnel and military contractors）. There are also 46 military bases in 11 countries of the Middle East and dozens of embassies and consulates. Since the US withdrawal from the comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear issue in May 2018， Trump has been emphasizing that American casualties are the red line of the US. The US targeted killings of Soleimani in early January 2020 showed that protecting the safety of its personnel and property remained the highest objective of the US Middle East strategy.
Second， the strategic objective of protecting the allies’ security is showing signs of swerving. The 2017 US National Security Strategy report states that the US pursues the following goals in the Middle East： the Middle East cannot become a hotbed of terrorism， cannot be controlled by hostile powers， and shall supply energy steadily， without mentioning the protection of its allies’ security. About the attack on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019， Trump said that it was “an attack on Saudi Arabia， not on the United States.” This statement signifies a complete departure from the “oil-for-security” principle agreed on between President Roosevelt and King Aziz in 1945， which has served as an important pillar of US Middle East strategy for the past 70 years. In October 2019， Trump called for a withdrawal from Syria， to which both parties in the US Congress opposed. Saying it meant a betrayal of the Kurds， America’s regional ally in the fight against the “IS”. In terms of protecting Israel， a growing number of people in the US believe that Israel is fully capable of protecting itself and that the burden of security should not be passed on to the United States. The US has repeatedly expressed its intention to withdraw from Syria and Iraq， which makes Israel feel that it can no longer fully rely on the US for security. Neither Obama nor Trump has ever explicitly expressed that the US will no longer be responsible for protecting its allies， yet they both require the allies to take more responsibilities for regional security. With great enthusiasm， Trump is organizing a “Middle East Security Alliance” （or so-called “Middle East small NATO”） aiming at easing the regional security burden on the United States. Third， strategic objectives such as energy supply， counter-terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have shifted. Along with the diminishing of the importance of the Middle East energy to the US， the region’s energy supply， counter-terrorism and preventing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are increasingly perceived by the US as an international public good rather than its own obligations， and the US commitments in these areas are beginning to loosen. Trump said the US has become the world’s largest oil producer and there is no reason to protect maritime shipping routes disregarding returns. But the US still plays a leading role on most security issues in the Middle East. As a hegemonic country with global interests， the US deems its involvement in the Middle East affairs as fulfilling its responsibilities as a global leader and providing public goods to the international community. It is worth noting that， it will be a big question about to what extent the US will be able to continuously increase its investment in the Middle East to ensure energy security for its allies and the international community after its own energy security has been garanteed.
Fourth， curbing Iran has become a central goal of the US Middle East strategy， yet its action and effectiveness are at odds. The Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy report emphasizes that counter-terrorism， containment of Iran and maintenance of energy security are the main objectives of the US strategy toward the Middle East. As the “Islamic State” has been severely hit and the US energy security has been secured， containment of Iran has become a central goal of the US Middle East strategy in recent years. On the one hand， the US imposed “extreme pressure” on Iran by denying and withdrawing from the comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear issue， restarting and increasing sanctions against Iran， and organizing regional allies to confront Iran. On the other hand， Trump has not acted to implement his strategic objectives， and his efforts to avoid war against Iran and plan to withdraw troops from Syria and Iraq， leaving Iran’s forces to expand increasingly， are clearly contrary to the strategic goal of containing Iran.
Failure of US Instruments
to Achieve Strategic
Objectives in the Middle East
Military deterrence， alliance assistance and peace negotiations were once the three major instruments of the US to achieve its strategic objectives in the Middle East. But with the changes in the Middle East and the domestic politics in the US， the three instruments are clearly failing. In protecting its allies and maintaining energy security， the US needs to show firm strategic will to reassure its allies and deter its enemies. The strong military strength and the huge garrison are the largest assets and the most powerful means of the US in the Middle East. However， the US has repeatedly released the signal of “contraction” and puts off its responsibility from time to time， aggravating the panic turbulence in the Middle East. On the one hand， the US constantly demonstrates its hard power; yet on the other hand， it does not have the will and determination to use it. Alliance assistance is an important means for the US to implement its Middle East strategy， that is， to achieve its strategic objectives by supporting its allies. Yet， with dramatically changing situation in the Middle East in recent years， though the US military aid policy has been as usual， the effect has been greatly reduced. For a long time， the US has followed the principle of “Qualitative Military Edge”， which means that Israel must have a weapon quality advantage to offset the military quantity advantage of Arab countries. However， due to the domestic political reasons， the US failed to readjust its policy in time， resulting in serious disconnection from the reality. The US， in support of and biased in favor of Israel， has paid enormous political price， affecting its relations with Arab countries， weakening its international reputation and increasing the risk of terrorist attacks. Therefore， the US hopes that the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli peace will finally be achieved， allowing itself to be released from the Israeli issue. But because of its biased favor for Israel， the US policy still fails to be effective in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Prospect of
Transformation of
US Middle East Strategy
The interests， strategic objectives and means of the United States in the Middle East are and will continue to be changing， and its strategic transformation is still a long way from reaching a stable consensus. At present， the relevant domestic policymakers in the US neither agree with the Bush-era large-scale intervention strategy， nor agree with the Obama-era “contractionism”. Instead， they hope to form a “strong， moderate interventionism” strategy. During the strategic transformation period， the US does not want to engage in comprehensive and large-scale military intervention， but only tries to intervene selectively and forcefully. Therefore， there is very little possibility that the US launches another large-scale war， yet policy contradictions and even chaos may become normal for a certain period of time.
The Arab countries are facing unprecedented hardship during the US strategic transformation. In 2011， when the US Middle East strategy entered the transformation period， a vacuum of power appeared in the region. Iran， Turkey， Israel and non-Arab countries quickly filled up， leaving the Arab countries besieged on all sides. On the Arab-Israeli issue， the Trump administration has been unprecedentedly pro-Israel， recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel， recognizing the Golan Heights as Israeli territory and supporting Israel’s possession of settlements in the Jordan Valley and the West Bank. The Arab countries have no choice but to swallow it. The Arab countries are also the ultimate victims of the deteriorating relation between the US and Iran. The red line before a war by the US does not include protecting the Arab countries， which can only rely on themselves， so they have to try to compromise with Iran. With the major changes in current political structure in the Middle East， the Arab countries are faced with a plight which is the result of their long-term dependence on the West in nearly a century.
The US is relatively resilient to the instability in the Middle East because of its strength， geographical remoteness from the Middle East and declining energy dependence on the Middle East countries. Therefore， even if the US Middle East strategy has faults or even fails， and its interests may be hurt， the biggest victims will still be the Middle East countries， or even European and Asian countries. The launching of the Iraqi war was a major failure of the US strategy in the Middle East， resulting in the erosion of its strategic interests. However， the US government did not collapse， nor did the country fall apart. Instead， the Iraqi people ended up in the destruction of their country and are still struggling in bitterness. This is a typical manifestation of the unjust and unreasonable international political order today.
China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
During the Cold War， the United States implemented an “offshore balance” policy in the Middle East， on the one hand， competing with the Soviet Union for a sphere of influence， and on the other hand， not directly engaging in the war. After the end of the Cold War， the US， as the sole super power， switched to the strategy of direct intervention in the Middle East. It launched two large-scale regional wars and put forward the “Plan on Democratic Reform of Great Middle East”. Marked by the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011， the US strategy toward Middle East entered a new period， which is the period of strategic transformation. Since entering the transformation period， the US Middle East strategy has shown inconsistency and capriciousness repeatedly. Looking back at the words and deeds of the Democrats and the Republicans as well as the American presidents， some basic characteristics of this strategic transformation period can be summed up.
Characteristics of Transformation Period of US strategy
toward Middle East
The transformation of the U.S Middle East strategy is a “reflection” on its large-scale military intervention in the 21st century. The US Middle East strategy has partly returned to the “normal” of “offshore balance”， and abandoning large-scale military intervention has become a bipartisan consensus in the US Congress. In specific， the transformation period of the US strategy toward Middle East is characterized by the following aspects.
First， large-scale military intervention， once the backbone of the US strategy toward Middle East， has been shelved and is likely to be abandoned in the future. The US dispatched troops of 530，000 people to the 1991 Gulf War and those of 160，000 to the 2003 Iraq War， yet this situation is unlikely to recur. In 2011， the then US Defense Secretary Robert Gates mentioned in his address at the West Point that it was already over to invade， occupy and liberate a country as part of America’s Middle East strategy. Since June 2019， US drones have been shot down by Iran， Saudi oil fields have been attacked， and US military bases have suffered from Iranian missile raid， yet the US has resorted to massive retaliation on none of those. This shows， from Obama to Trump， unless Americans or American property are directly and seriously attacked， the US is not likely to launch another large-scale war in the Middle East， which constitutes the most important and prominent change in the transformation period of the US strategy toward the Middle East. Second， exporting western democratic models， which used to be another pillar of US Middle East strategy for a long time， has been shelved by the Trump administration. On the ideological front， the US will never abandon the exportation of western democratic ideas. Yet， the era of the US exporting western democratic models to the Middle East as an operational policy or systematic strategy is ending. Since 2006， the US has enthusiastically supported the democratic elections in Palestine， Egypt， Tunisia， Libya， Iraq and Yemen， but almost all of them have ended with disastrous consequences. In the face of the painful lessons， the US has changed its policy. The year 2019 witnessed the outbreak of the so-called “second wave of Arab Spring” in the Middle East， with large-scale demonstrations in countries including Algeria， Sudan， Iraq and Lebanon， the national leaders of which were forced to step down. Contrary to its usual practice， the US neither offered political support to the opposition， nor deeply engaged in the internal affairs of the countries concerned.
Third， the US confidence in building peace in the Middle East has been seriously undermined， its willingness to support basic and constructive long-term planning declined， and its emphasis on transactional and ad hoc work has been increasing. In the past decade， the US has not led the peace process in Syria， Yemen and Libya， nor has it actively participated in the post-war reconstruction of the relevant countries. Its willingness and action to invest in social stability and economic development in key countries such as Egypt， Jordan， Iraq and Lebanon have both declined. While the US retains the US$1.3 billion annual military aid to Egypt， its economic aid has been reduced from US$800 million two decades ago to today’s US$120 million. On the Palestine-Israel issue， the US has cancelled most of its aids to Palestine and has almost stopped all supportive actions. The US closed its consulate in the southern Iraqi city of Basra in September 2018 and withdrew all non-military personnel in Iraq in early 2020 due to the deteriorating security situation. Those measures may become permanent arrangements.
Fourth， the US chooses not to engage in large-scale ground operations while to increase air intervention， with the intention of leading Middle East affairs with zero casualties. Although the US has not been directly involved in ground operations in the Middle East since 2011， it has never been absent from the Middle East battlefield. It has been engaged in the air and on the shore. It provided air force in the NATO-led war in Libya， which overthrew the Qaddafi regime. It assisted and trained Syrian opposition forces to form and lead an international coalition against “IS” extremist groups. The US also sent ground troops back to Iraq and air forces targeting terrorist forces in Libya and Yemen. On January 3， 2020， the US army exerted a targeted killing to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp’s Holy City Brigade Commander Soleimani. This “light print” type of military intervention will become the major way for US future intervention in the Middle East. Fifth， the US will not reduce its investment by a large margin in the Middle East in a short term， and will remain the most influential external country in the Middle East for a long time to come. Although the US is withdrawing its combat troops from the Middle East hotspots， its garrison and military bases in the Middle East are still maintained. At present， the US garrison in the Middle East total about 60，000 to 80，000， and it maintains two aircraft carrier battle groups. US arms sales to the Middle East in 2019 totaled US$25.5 billion， accounting for one-third of its global total （US$69.7 million）. For many years， the Middle East has been the biggest beneficiary of the US aid， taking about 35% of all its foreign aid. The US has been frequently involved in hotspot issues in the Middle East by comprehensive means of air strikes， military deterrence， arms sales， military assistance， alignment and mutual assistance. The Trump administration exercising “extreme pressure” on Iran， the formation of a “Middle-East version of NATO”， the launch of the so-called “century agreement” to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict， the mediation of the “Eastern Mediterranean Alliance”， and the mediation of Saudi relations with Qatar， all these together further highlight the strengthening of the US presence in the Middle East.
Changing US Interests
in Middle East
The Obama administration summed up in 2011 the US interests in the Middle East as follows： energy， counter-terrorism， preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction， and protecting Israel’s security and promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The US interests in the Middle East have been concentrated on the four areas for several decades and rarely disputed， yet the priorities among the four are changing. Although many in the US admit that the importance of the Middle East to the US has declined， there is no consensus on the extent of the decline.
Middle East oil is less important now. Theoretically， the US has emerged from its dependence on Middle East oil and achieved the so-called “energy independence”. Trump said on January 8， 2020， that the US has become the world’s largest oil and gas producer， achieving energy independence and no longer in need of the Middle East oil. The US achieved a daily production of 15.3 million barrels of liquid oil in 2018， listed the world first. In September 2019， it achieved monthly net exports of oil. According to the US Energy Information Agency estimate， the US will be a stable net exporter of oil in 2020. In this sense， the US does achieve its energy independence. But in fact， the US still needs to import heavy crude oil from the Middle East. In 2001， the US imported 2.8 million barrels of crude oil from the Middle East per day， accounting for 23% of its gross daily imports of crude oil， which were 11.9 million barrels. In comparison， its daily imports of crude oil from the Middle East in 2019 were 900 thousand barrels， accounting for 9% of its gross imports of 8 million barrels per day. It can be seen that the US still needs Middle East oil， though both the absolute and relative shares of imports have declined. At the same time， US oil price is still affected by the Middle East situation， yet increasingly limited. Structurally， Middle East oil is less important in international oil market than it was. Middle East oil exports accounted for 50% of the world total in 1980， yet only 35% in 2018. In terms of perspective， with an oversupply of oil in international market in the next few years， the impact of oil production fluctuations in the Middle East will be weakened. However， since 21% of global oil consumption goes through the Strait of Hormuz， any turbulence in the Persian Gulf is bound to impact international oil prices. Overall， the importance of the Middle East to the US energy security has declined considerably compared with that of a decade ago. However， the Middle East oil remains significant to the US， with one-fifth of the world oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz and the oil producers in the Middle East providing one-third of the global oil exports as well as most of the world’s mobile production capacity. The change in the importance of the Middle East oil to the US is the focus of controversy in the transformation period of the US strategy toward the Middle East.
It is one of the fundamental interests of the US to protect the security of Israel， the most reliable ally of the US in the Middle East and also known as the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” of the US in the Middle East. Since the third Middle East War in 1967， the US has become the strongest supporter of Israel， and the US-Israeli alliance has become increasingly clear， and special relations gradually formed. During the Cold War， the US and the Soviet Union fought a “minor Cold War” in the Middle East， and Israel rushed to the front line to contain the Soviet Camp states such as Egypt， Syria and Iraq. With the end of the Cold War， the status of Israel as a bridgehead of the Cold War changed into a vanguard of the US to block Iran and fight terrorism. However， the significance of Israel to the US was once again questioned in terms of both real interests and ideology. In terms of real interests， American neo-realist theoretician Millsheimer believes that it is because of the US one-sided support for Israel that terrorist organizations and Iran resent and oppose the US， so Israel is a major reason for the US becoming a terrorist target. Taking Israel as an important anti-terrorist and anti-Iran ally is like putting the cart before the horse. Therefore， abandoning the special relationship between the US and Israel is the most effective anti-terrorism measure. In terms of ideology， in recent years， a growing number of American liberals have been dissatisfied with Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestine， discrimination against its own Arabs and the strengthening of its Jewish attributes， which all run counter to the democratic values that the US agrees to and fade Israel’s “democratic image”. Israel， which used to enjoy unanimous support from both parties in the US， is now a subject of partisan controversy， with the overwhelming majority of Republicans supporting it， while the new Democratic left opposes supporting it. Changing Objectives
of US Middle East Strategy
Interest serves as the basis on which the goal is determined， and the change of interest leads to the change of the goal. US fundamental interest in the Middle East is energy security. If the importance of the Middle East energy to the US falls， all of the above-mentioned four goals will be undermined， and that is the root cause of the current uncertainties in the strategic objectives of the US in the Middle East.
First， it is the primary goal of US Middle East strategy to protect the safety of its own personnel and property. At present， the US military forces deployed in the Middle East have about 100，000 people （including regular military personnel and military contractors）. There are also 46 military bases in 11 countries of the Middle East and dozens of embassies and consulates. Since the US withdrawal from the comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear issue in May 2018， Trump has been emphasizing that American casualties are the red line of the US. The US targeted killings of Soleimani in early January 2020 showed that protecting the safety of its personnel and property remained the highest objective of the US Middle East strategy.
Second， the strategic objective of protecting the allies’ security is showing signs of swerving. The 2017 US National Security Strategy report states that the US pursues the following goals in the Middle East： the Middle East cannot become a hotbed of terrorism， cannot be controlled by hostile powers， and shall supply energy steadily， without mentioning the protection of its allies’ security. About the attack on Saudi oil facilities in September 2019， Trump said that it was “an attack on Saudi Arabia， not on the United States.” This statement signifies a complete departure from the “oil-for-security” principle agreed on between President Roosevelt and King Aziz in 1945， which has served as an important pillar of US Middle East strategy for the past 70 years. In October 2019， Trump called for a withdrawal from Syria， to which both parties in the US Congress opposed. Saying it meant a betrayal of the Kurds， America’s regional ally in the fight against the “IS”. In terms of protecting Israel， a growing number of people in the US believe that Israel is fully capable of protecting itself and that the burden of security should not be passed on to the United States. The US has repeatedly expressed its intention to withdraw from Syria and Iraq， which makes Israel feel that it can no longer fully rely on the US for security. Neither Obama nor Trump has ever explicitly expressed that the US will no longer be responsible for protecting its allies， yet they both require the allies to take more responsibilities for regional security. With great enthusiasm， Trump is organizing a “Middle East Security Alliance” （or so-called “Middle East small NATO”） aiming at easing the regional security burden on the United States. Third， strategic objectives such as energy supply， counter-terrorism and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have shifted. Along with the diminishing of the importance of the Middle East energy to the US， the region’s energy supply， counter-terrorism and preventing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are increasingly perceived by the US as an international public good rather than its own obligations， and the US commitments in these areas are beginning to loosen. Trump said the US has become the world’s largest oil producer and there is no reason to protect maritime shipping routes disregarding returns. But the US still plays a leading role on most security issues in the Middle East. As a hegemonic country with global interests， the US deems its involvement in the Middle East affairs as fulfilling its responsibilities as a global leader and providing public goods to the international community. It is worth noting that， it will be a big question about to what extent the US will be able to continuously increase its investment in the Middle East to ensure energy security for its allies and the international community after its own energy security has been garanteed.
Fourth， curbing Iran has become a central goal of the US Middle East strategy， yet its action and effectiveness are at odds. The Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy report emphasizes that counter-terrorism， containment of Iran and maintenance of energy security are the main objectives of the US strategy toward the Middle East. As the “Islamic State” has been severely hit and the US energy security has been secured， containment of Iran has become a central goal of the US Middle East strategy in recent years. On the one hand， the US imposed “extreme pressure” on Iran by denying and withdrawing from the comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear issue， restarting and increasing sanctions against Iran， and organizing regional allies to confront Iran. On the other hand， Trump has not acted to implement his strategic objectives， and his efforts to avoid war against Iran and plan to withdraw troops from Syria and Iraq， leaving Iran’s forces to expand increasingly， are clearly contrary to the strategic goal of containing Iran.
Failure of US Instruments
to Achieve Strategic
Objectives in the Middle East
Military deterrence， alliance assistance and peace negotiations were once the three major instruments of the US to achieve its strategic objectives in the Middle East. But with the changes in the Middle East and the domestic politics in the US， the three instruments are clearly failing. In protecting its allies and maintaining energy security， the US needs to show firm strategic will to reassure its allies and deter its enemies. The strong military strength and the huge garrison are the largest assets and the most powerful means of the US in the Middle East. However， the US has repeatedly released the signal of “contraction” and puts off its responsibility from time to time， aggravating the panic turbulence in the Middle East. On the one hand， the US constantly demonstrates its hard power; yet on the other hand， it does not have the will and determination to use it. Alliance assistance is an important means for the US to implement its Middle East strategy， that is， to achieve its strategic objectives by supporting its allies. Yet， with dramatically changing situation in the Middle East in recent years， though the US military aid policy has been as usual， the effect has been greatly reduced. For a long time， the US has followed the principle of “Qualitative Military Edge”， which means that Israel must have a weapon quality advantage to offset the military quantity advantage of Arab countries. However， due to the domestic political reasons， the US failed to readjust its policy in time， resulting in serious disconnection from the reality. The US， in support of and biased in favor of Israel， has paid enormous political price， affecting its relations with Arab countries， weakening its international reputation and increasing the risk of terrorist attacks. Therefore， the US hopes that the Palestinian-Israeli and Arab-Israeli peace will finally be achieved， allowing itself to be released from the Israeli issue. But because of its biased favor for Israel， the US policy still fails to be effective in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Prospect of
Transformation of
US Middle East Strategy
The interests， strategic objectives and means of the United States in the Middle East are and will continue to be changing， and its strategic transformation is still a long way from reaching a stable consensus. At present， the relevant domestic policymakers in the US neither agree with the Bush-era large-scale intervention strategy， nor agree with the Obama-era “contractionism”. Instead， they hope to form a “strong， moderate interventionism” strategy. During the strategic transformation period， the US does not want to engage in comprehensive and large-scale military intervention， but only tries to intervene selectively and forcefully. Therefore， there is very little possibility that the US launches another large-scale war， yet policy contradictions and even chaos may become normal for a certain period of time.
The Arab countries are facing unprecedented hardship during the US strategic transformation. In 2011， when the US Middle East strategy entered the transformation period， a vacuum of power appeared in the region. Iran， Turkey， Israel and non-Arab countries quickly filled up， leaving the Arab countries besieged on all sides. On the Arab-Israeli issue， the Trump administration has been unprecedentedly pro-Israel， recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel， recognizing the Golan Heights as Israeli territory and supporting Israel’s possession of settlements in the Jordan Valley and the West Bank. The Arab countries have no choice but to swallow it. The Arab countries are also the ultimate victims of the deteriorating relation between the US and Iran. The red line before a war by the US does not include protecting the Arab countries， which can only rely on themselves， so they have to try to compromise with Iran. With the major changes in current political structure in the Middle East， the Arab countries are faced with a plight which is the result of their long-term dependence on the West in nearly a century.
The US is relatively resilient to the instability in the Middle East because of its strength， geographical remoteness from the Middle East and declining energy dependence on the Middle East countries. Therefore， even if the US Middle East strategy has faults or even fails， and its interests may be hurt， the biggest victims will still be the Middle East countries， or even European and Asian countries. The launching of the Iraqi war was a major failure of the US strategy in the Middle East， resulting in the erosion of its strategic interests. However， the US government did not collapse， nor did the country fall apart. Instead， the Iraqi people ended up in the destruction of their country and are still struggling in bitterness. This is a typical manifestation of the unjust and unreasonable international political order today.