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提出一种基于Swarm的仿真模型,对信息不完全市场下发电企业经营过程中的静态、动态和学习演化行为进行仿真.模型刻画了发电企业利用在博弈过程中所获取的信息,不断修正自己行为规则的演化过程.通过仿真发现:具有效仿能力的发电企业的平均供电量高于不具有效仿能力的发电企业;市场退出机制能够促进发电企业进行行为优化,最终生存在市场上的是能够准确预测对手的发电商,此时发电企业平均供电量高于无市场退出机制下发电企业;在无退出机制下,由于缺乏优化决策的激励,采用优化博弈模型的发电企业的个数较少.
A simulation model based on Swarm is proposed to simulate the static, dynamic and evolution of learning and evolution during the operation of power generation enterprises in the incomplete information market.The model depicts the power generation enterprises to make use of the information obtained during the game and constantly modify their behavior The evolution of the rules.The simulation shows that the average power supply of decentralized power generation enterprises is higher than that of non-emulated power generation companies, the market exit mechanism can promote the optimization of power generation enterprises, and finally survive on the market can accurately predict At the same time, the average power supply of power generation enterprises is higher than that of power generation enterprises without market exit mechanism. Due to the lack of incentives for optimal decision-making, the number of power generation enterprises adopting the optimized game model is relatively small.