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本文构建了包含终极股东权力和管理者策略性行为的模型,探究终极股东权力对管理者在职消费的影响,并利用我国民营上市公司的数据进行实证检验,结果表明,终极股东权力提升会显著降低在职消费水平,证实了终极股东对于管理者在职消费认识的“代理观”。同时,研究发现,持有公司股份的管理者虽具有较低的在职消费水平,但却缓解了终极股东对管理者在职消费的约束。管理者特征对在职消费水平的影响存在差异,性别特征对在职消费不具有显著影响,而年龄和学历水平对在职消费分别存在显著的负向和正向效应,高学历水平还能够消除终极股东对管理者在职消费的限制。本文的研究为民营企业的委托一代理冲突和在职消费治理提供了有益的启示。
This paper constructs a model that contains the ultimate shareholder’s power and managers’ strategic behavior, explores the influence of the ultimate shareholder’s power on the incumbency consumption of managers, and uses the data of Chinese private listed companies to conduct empirical tests. The result shows that the ultimate shareholder’s power increase will be significantly reduced The level of on-the-job consumption confirms the “proxy view” of ultimate shareholders’ understanding of on-the-job consumption of managers. At the same time, the study found that although the managers who hold the shares of the company have a lower level of in-service consumption, they ease the restriction of the ultimate shareholders on the in-service consumption of the managers. There are differences in the impact of managers’ characteristics on the level of on-the-job consumption. Gender characteristics have no significant effect on on-the-job consumption. However, age and education levels have significant negative and positive effects on on-the-job consumption respectively. On-the-job consumption restrictions. The research in this paper provides useful enlightenment for the private-owned enterprises in commissioning and agency conflict and in-service consumption governance.