国有企业建立现代企业制度以后,企业所有者与经营者之间实质上也就形成了一种委托代理关系,双方作为理性的“经济人”具有不同的效用目标,都力图使自己获得最大效用。信息不对称所导致的逆向选择和道德风险使得国有企业经理层往往偏离所有者的目标而追求自己的最大效用,当这种偏离缺乏监督或监督不足时会严重损害企业的发展和背离社会最优化目标。目前我国国有企业的领导层经营积极性方面存在的问题比较突出,集中表现为国有企业的领导层的短期行为、过分的公款消费行为,甚至发生侵吞国有资产的恶劣行为等。这些问题严重损害国家和广大职 After the establishment of the modern enterprise system in state-owned enterprises, the owners and managers of the enterprise form a kind of principal-agent relationship in essence, and both parties have different utility goals as rational “economic agents” and try to maximize their own utility. The adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information make SOE manager often deviate from owner's goal and pursue its own maximum effectiveness. When such deviation is lack of supervision or oversight, it will seriously damage the development of enterprise and deviate from social optimization aims. At present, the problems existing in the enthusiasm of the leadership of state-owned enterprises in our country are quite prominent, which are characterized by the short-term behavior of the leadership of state-owned enterprises, over-spending of public funds, and even the vicious acts of embezzling state-owned assets. These problems have seriously damaged the country and the vast majority of staff