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中央红军从撤离苏区到通过敌之第四道封锁线,不过才走出二万五千里征程的约十分之一,就已损失过半。特别是过敌之第四道封锁线之战,血染湘江,是红军长征史上最为被动惨烈的一幕,也是红军战争指导史上最为拙劣的一例,教训深刻,值得深入研究,深层揭示。迄今的相关史著对这里的原因有过定论,既说是由于控制中央红军指挥全权的博古、李德实行退却中的逃跑主义造成的,又说是他们的“大搬家”错误思想指导造成的。这个结论是正确的。可是,不论是词义上还是现实中,逃跑与搬家都是风马牛不相及的两
From the withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army to the fourth blockade through the enemy line, the Central Red Army lost more than half its figure of 10% out of its 25,000-kilometer journey. In particular, the war on the fourth blockade of the enemy and the bloody dyeing of the Xiangjiang River are the most passive and violent scenes in the history of the Red Army. They are also the most clumsy case in the history of the Red Army’s war. The lesson is profound and it is worth further studying and revealing in depth. The relevant history to date has been a cause for controversy, not only because of Bogut, who controlled the Central Red Army’s command but also because of his escapeism in retreat, and also said that they were guided by the wrong thinking of “big move” Caused. This conclusion is correct. However, both in word sense and in reality, escape and move are irrelevant