同样的规制设计,在不同国家、地区或不同时期为什么会出现不同绩效?围绕这一问题,本文以电力行业为研究对象探讨了规制经济学中被忽视的非正式制度对规制安排及绩效的影响。通过拓展的结构性剩余索取权概念,建立了一个加入非正式制度变量的激励校正模型,得出了剩余分配倾向于积极性非正式制度的最优分配原则。在此基础上,提出了基于结构性剩余索取权的ISP激励性规制,探讨了我国电力行业合作激励的“四阶段”改革和发展思路。 The same regulatory design, in different countries, regions or different periods of why there will be different performance? Around this issue, this paper discusses the power industry as a research object of informal economics in regulatory economics on regulatory arrangements and performance impact . Through expanding the concept of structural residual claim, a model of incentive correction that incorporates informal institutional variables is established, and the optimal distribution principle of surplus distribution tends to positive informality is obtained. On this basis, ISP incentive regulation based on structural residual claim is proposed, and the reform and development of “four phases” of cooperation incentives in power industry in our country are discussed.