论文部分内容阅读
专项投资是研发联盟中实现资源互补必不可少的部分。基于交易成本理论和社会交换理论,分析了研发联盟背景下企业专项投资对自身知识被侵占风险的影响,以及企业监督和善意信任对专项投资与知识被侵占风险之间关系的调节作用。通过对155家参与合作创新的制造业企业发放问卷来收集样本,采用多元统计分析方法对假设进行验证。结果表明:(1)企业专项投资与其知识被侵占风险之间存在正相关关系;(2)监督削弱了企业专项投资与其知识被侵占风险之间的正向关系;(3)善意信任会对“专项投资—知识被侵占风险”关系产生U型调节作用:即适度的善意信任会降低企业专项投资带来的知识被侵占风险,而过低或过高的善意信任都会放大专项投资带来的知识被侵占风险。
Special investment is an integral part of the R & D alliance to achieve complementary resources. Based on the transaction cost theory and social exchange theory, this paper analyzes the impact of corporate-specific investment on the risk of encroaching upon own knowledge in the R & D alliance and the regulatory role of corporate supervision and goodwill trust on the relationship between special investment and the risk of knowledge encroachment. The questionnaire was collected from 155 manufacturing enterprises involved in cooperative innovation to collect samples and the multivariate statistical analysis was used to test the hypothesis. The results show that: (1) there is a positive correlation between the firm-specific investment and the risk of its knowledge being invaded; (2) the supervision weakens the positive relationship between firm-specific investment and the risk of its knowledge being invaded; (3) “Special investment - the risk of knowledge being invaded” has a U-shaped regulatory role: a modest, goodwill trust will reduce the risk of knowledge being intruded by a firm’s specialized investment, while a too low or too high a level of trust will amplify the special investment The knowledge is invaded risk.