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本文试探究中国上市公司政治联系的内在机制。从上市公司、政治联系人、政府官员的利益角度出发,基于双重委托-代理模型通过对比两种政治联系方式(项目合作形式和聘用形式)的博弈分析,结果表明项目合作方式优势是上市公司不参与管理和监督、不承担任何项目前期操作风险,但其期望效益不及聘用形式,揭示中国上市公司管理层中大量出现具有政治背景的高管的根本原因是上市公司倾向于选择期望效益大的聘用形式进行政治联系。
This article tries to probe into the internal mechanism of the political connection of Chinese listed companies. From the perspective of the interests of listed companies, political contacts and government officials, this paper compares the two political connections (project cooperation and employment) based on the double principal-agent model. The results show that the advantage of the project cooperation is that the listed company Participate in the management and supervision, and do not assume any pre-project operational risk. However, the expectant benefit is less than that of employment. The fundamental reason why a large number of executives with political background appear in the management of listed companies in China is that listed companies tend to choose the hiring of expectant benefit Form of political contact.