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在20世纪末独资化已成趋势的中国大背景下,作者引入内生交易费用经济学机会主义和不完全契约的假定,从专用性资产的套牢效应和专有性资产的溢出效应导致联盟冲突的角度,对中国电梯工业的合资独资案例进行研究,研究表明,资产属性导致联盟内生冲突是跨国公司在中国独资化的本质原因。最后,作者给出强势联盟和异质联盟是保持合资企业相对稳定的治理结构的原创性建议。
Under the background of China, which has become the trend of sole proprietorship in the late 20th century, the author introduces the hypothesis of endogenous transaction cost economics opportunism and incomplete contract that the coalition conflicts caused by the jailbreak effect of the exclusive assets and the spillover effect of the exclusive assets The author studies the case of joint-venture wholly-owned enterprises in China’s elevator industry. The research shows that the intrinsic nature of asset ownership leads to the inherent causes of multinational corporations’ sole proprietorship in China. Finally, the author gives a strong coalition and a heterogeneous coalition are original proposals to maintain a relatively stable governance structure of the joint venture.