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本文利用2001-2010年中国省级PM2.5年度数据,运用空间杜宾模型,分析财政分权对雾霾污染及其波动的影响,揭示地方政府在环境治理中的行为,并验证中国环境治理“搭便车”现象的存在性。结果表明,财政分权对雾霾的影响存在明显的空间相关性,财政分权度的提高会显著加剧本地区及周边地区的雾霾污染,但财政分权对以工业固体废弃物为代表的局部性污染物作用不明显,中国存在雾霾污染“搭便车”现象;财政分权对雾霾污染波动的直接效应显著为正,间接效应显著为负,综合之下,其总效应不显著。地方政府能有效控制本地雾霾污染,但由于环境“竞次”竞争,地方政府会削弱对环境的把控。
In this paper, we use the annual provincial PM2.5 data from 2001 to 2010 to analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on smog pollution and its fluctuations using the spatial Dubin model to reveal the behavior of local governments in environmental governance and to verify that China’s environmental governance “Hitchhiking ” the existence of the phenomenon. The results show that there is a clear spatial correlation between fiscal decentralization and smog. The increase of fiscal decentralization will significantly exacerbate smog pollution in the region and its surrounding areas. However, the fiscal decentralization is mainly represented by industrial solid waste The effect of local pollutants is not obvious, there is the phenomenon of “free riding” in China; the direct effect of fiscal decentralization on the fluctuation of smog pollution is positive and the indirect effect is significantly negative; under the overall situation, the total effect is not Significant. Local governments can effectively control local smog pollution, but due to environmental “competition ” competition, local governments will weaken the control of the environment.