改革开放以来,中央政府与地方政府之间由计划经济下的控制与被控制的关系逐渐演变为市场经济下的委托与代理的关系;地方政府虽然成为一个相对独立的利益主体,但在委托代理关系下却面临着政治上的晋升激励。本文在Holmstrom和Milgrom的理论框架基础上构造多任务委托代理模型得出:中央对地方政府官员的政绩考核更偏向于易于测量的经济增长率指标,导致地方财政支出结构扭曲,表现在地方政府倾向于将财政资源投入基础设施建设,而对非经济性公共服务支出不足。基于此得到两个命题并通过面板回归模型予以实证检验,结果发现:在政治激励下,财政分权对基础设施建设影响显著,对非经济性公共服务提供影响不显著;另外得出,当公共服务被纳入地方政府绩效并形成有效考核指标,激励制度会促使地方政府提高对公共服务的财政支出力度;而公共服务质量的进一步提升则需要建立更加科学的政府绩效评价体系。 Since the reform and opening up, the relationship between the control and the controlled under the planned economy between the central government and the local government has gradually evolved into the relationship between the commission and the agent under the market economy. Although the local government has become a relatively independent stakeholder, Under the relationship is facing the political promotion incentive. Based on the theoretical framework of Holmstrom and Milgrom, this paper constructs multitasking principal-agent model, which shows that the performance evaluation of local government officials by central government tends to be more easy to measure the economic growth rate index, resulting in the distortion of local fiscal expenditure structure, which is manifested in the tendency of local governments In putting financial resources into infrastructure construction, spending on non-economic public services is insufficient. Based on this, two propositions are obtained and tested by panel regression model. The result shows that fiscal decentralization has a significant impact on infrastructure construction and insignificant impact on non-economic public services under the political motivation. In addition, Services are incorporated into the performance of local governments and form effective assessment indicators. Incentives will prompt local governments to increase their financial expenditures on public services. To further improve the quality of public services, we need to establish a more scientific government performance evaluation system.