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我国的经理人股票期权激励计划一般对期权的行权价格提供股利保护,这对不同股权激励工具选择与公司现金股利政策之间的关系会产生什么影响呢?本文利用2006-2012年间正式实施股权激励计划的A股上市公司的相关数据对此展开实证研究,结果发现,使用限制性股票作为股权激励工具的公司还是比使用股票期权作为股权激励工具的公司现金分红概率更高,现金股利支付水平也更高;进一步的研究表明当公司董事长为限制性股票的激励对象时公司现金股利支付水平显著较高。本文的发现意味着,限制性股票是比股票期权更佳的股权激励工具,能够更好地把经理人利益和股东长远利益捆绑在一起,而激励对象也会影响股权激励计划的效果。
China’s manager stock option incentive plan generally provides dividend protection for the exercise price of the option. What impact will this have on the relationship between the different equity incentive tool choices and the company’s cash dividend policy? This article uses the formal implementation of equity between 2006 and 2012 The empirical research on the A-share listed companies of the Incentive Plan shows that the companies that use the restricted stock as the equity incentive tool still have a higher probability of cash dividend than the company that uses the stock option as the equity incentive and the cash dividend payment level Also higher; further research shows that when the chairman of the board of directors of restricted stock incentive object, the cash dividend payment level is significantly higher. The findings of this paper show that restricted stocks are better equity incentive instruments than stock options, which can better tie the interests of managers and the long-term interests of shareholders, while the incentive objects also affect the effectiveness of equity incentive plans.