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本文基于有代表性的全国抽样数据,系统考察了2005年信访改革在农村基层的差异性影响。这次改革有效消减了农村信访数量,但消解大规模群体性上访的效果并不明显,甚至一定程度上刺激了非信访群体性事件。导致上述差异的关键,在于基层干部采用了不同手段和策略来执行消减信访的政策。在执行策略摇摆不定的村庄,消解信访可能额外激发制度外抗争;而在执行策略稳定的情况下,无论采用温和手段化解矛盾还是采用强硬手段压制抗争,都不会额外激发制度外抗争。造成基层干部出现执行手段和策略分野的原因,在于地方权力结构和资源禀赋的差异。
Based on the representative national sampling data, this paper systematically examines the differences in the petty petition reform in rural areas in 2005. The reform effectively reduced the number of petitions in rural areas, but the effect of resolving large-scale mass petitions was not obvious, and even to some extent, stimulated the mass incidents of non-petitions. The key to the above differences is that grassroots cadres have adopted different measures and strategies to implement the policy of reducing petitions. In villages with volatile strategies, eliminating petitions may in addition stimulate extra-regime protests; and in the case of a stable implementation strategy, no restraint will be induced outside the system, no matter using moderate measures to dissolve them or hard-line methods to suppress them. The reason why the grass-roots cadres have the means of implementation and the division of tactics lies in the differences between local power structures and resource endowments.