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文章以1996~2007年深、沪两市上市公司作为研究样本,应用固定效应模型实证检验了我国上市公司治理机制的有效性以及投资者保护制度对该机制的影响效应。研究结果表明,CEO的异常变更可能性与公司的绩效及违法违规处罚呈负相关,但与两者的交互作用正相关。说明我国上市公司的治理机制已发挥作用,但投资者保护制度并未对公司治理机制起到应有的改善作用。
The article takes the listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 1996 to 2007 as the research samples, and uses the fixed effect model to test the effectiveness of the governance mechanism of listed companies in our country and the impact of the investor protection system on the mechanism. The results show that the CEO’s abnormal change probability is negatively correlated with the company’s performance and illegal punishment, but it is positively correlated with the interaction between the two. It shows that the governance mechanism of listed companies in our country has played a role, but the investor protection system does not play a proper role in improving the corporate governance mechanism.