论文针对网络攻防中入侵者与入侵检测及其响应系统之间的关系,通过参考以往博弈模型,建立了一个基于双矩阵非零和博弈的入侵检测模型,并通过Lemke-Howson算法推导出整个博弈的最优混合策略,且对攻防双方的成本进行分析,探讨了最优策略中各个因素之间的函数关系。 In this paper, aiming at the relationship between intruder detection and intrusion detection system and its response system in network attack and defense, an intrusion detection model based on double matrix non-zero-sum game is established by referring to the previous game model, and the whole game is deduced by Lemke-Howson algorithm , And analyzes the cost of both offensive and defensive, and explores the functional relationship among the various factors in the optimal strategy.