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相比于西方成熟资本市场 ,我国企业债券市场出现了供给不足、需求不旺的反常现象。本文从市场的微观基础入手对此问题进行分析 ,发现 :一方面在强政府主导的市场机制下 ,企业债券融资并没有成本优势 ;另一方面 ,规则内的企业 ,由于自身产权独立性的缺陷和企业债券信号发送功能的散失 ,再加上同样存在“内部人控制”倾向的国有商业银行配合 ,缺乏发行企业债券的动力 ,规则外的实力企业 ,又由于规则的限制而无法发行。投资者也因为承担风险得不到补偿和流动性等问题 ,无法产生对企业债券的热情。在此基础上 ,作者提出了相关的政策建议 :建立、改变和完善企业债券的相关制度 ;减持国有股 ,防止内部人控制 ;塑造真正的企业债券发行主体 ;建立和完善企业信用评级制度 ;开展场外交易和允许商业银行进行企业债券交易。
Compared with the mature capital market in the west, there is an anomaly in China’s corporate bond market due to insufficient supply and weak demand. On the one hand, under the market mechanism dominated by strong government, there is no cost advantage in corporate bond financing; on the other hand, the enterprises within the rules, due to the defect of their own property rights independence, And the loss of corporate bond signaling, coupled with the state-owned commercial banks that also have the tendency of “insider control,” the lack of motivation to issue corporate bonds and the out-of-rules powerful enterprises can not be issued because of the rules. Investors are also unable to generate their enthusiasm for corporate bonds because they are not compensated for risks and liquidity. On this basis, the author put forward relevant policy recommendations: establishing, changing and improving the relevant systems of corporate bonds; reducing state-owned shares, preventing insider control; shaping the real corporate bond issuance body; establishing and perfecting corporate credit rating system; OTC and allowing commercial banks to trade corporate bonds.