论文部分内容阅读
证券监管处罚作为公司外生冲击事件,直接或间接影响违规公司未来的会计与财务行为。本文选取2006—2014年中国A股上市公司违规监管数据为研究样本,基于行为金融学理论,从声誉修复角度考察证券监管处罚对违规公司投资行为的影响。研究发现:(1)与未受处罚的公司相比,违规公司被处罚后倾向于过度投资,通过激进的投资行为对冲处罚的负面影响,借以修复公司受损形象,但导致公司投资效率下降,损害投资者利益;(2)CEO学历水平越高,上述现象越严重;(3)公司内部治理机制并未能有效约束高学历CEO的刺激反应。最后,使用匹配后双重差值分析、样本自抽样回归分析,以及不同子样本、不同匹配变量多重检验分析后,结果一致稳健。本文立足企业微观经济行为,拓展了证券监管处罚经济后果的研究视角。
Securities regulatory punishment as a company exogenous shocks, directly or indirectly, the future illegal accounting and financial behavior. Based on the behavioral finance theory, this paper examines the impact of securities regulatory penalties on the investment behavior of non-compliance companies from the perspective of reputation restoration by taking the non-compliance regulatory data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2014 as the research sample. The findings are as follows: (1) Compared with non-punished companies, non-compliance companies tend to over-invest after they are punished, hedging the damaged image of the company by hedging the negative impact of punishment through aggressive investment behavior, Damage the interests of investors; (2) the higher the education level of CEO, the more serious the above-mentioned phenomenon; (3) The internal governance mechanism of the company fails to effectively restrain the stimulus response of highly educated CEO. Finally, using the double difference analysis after matching, sample self-sampling regression analysis, and different sub-samples, the results of multiple matching tests with different matching variables are consistent and robust. Based on the microeconomic behavior of enterprises, this article expands the research perspective of the economic consequences of securities regulatory punishment.